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TAX
I. Bob Jones University v. United States
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC), § 501, prGvides that certain classes of organizations, including corporations "organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary or educational purposes,"
among others, "shall be exempt from taxation. .

. ."'

Prior to

1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) granted exempt status to such organizations without consideration of their
racial policies and practices. Beginning that year, however, the
Service announced that it would no longer grant tax-exempt
status to schools, including church-related schools whose admissions policies were racially discriminatory. Rules and procedures reflective of the new IRS policy were subsequently pro2
mulgated.
' 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976).
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev.
Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The rules, procedural guidelines and formal regulations governing eligibility for charitable tax
benefits are promulgated pursuant to the Treasury Department's general power
to promulgate rules essential to the enforcement of the IRC: "[Tihe Secretary or
his delegate shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement
of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of
any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue." 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1976).
Considerable controversy has arisen with respect to whether this general rule
making authority is broad enough to emcompass the substantive changes worked
by the Services' post-1970 interpretation of the congressional intent underlying §
2

501(c)(3).
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Bob Jones University (Bob Jones or the University), founded
in 1927 and located, since 1940, in Greenville, South Carolina, is
one of the organizations which found itself at loggerheads with
the newly formulated IRS policy. Bob Jones is both a religious
and an educational institution. While it is not associated with
any particular religious denomination, fundamentalist Christian
dogma pervades every aspect of its many educational and extracurricular programs.' The University has long interpreted
the Bible as prohibiting interracial dating and marriage. Purportedly as a result of, and in furtherance of this belief, the
University, from 1971 until May 29, 1975, refused to enroll unmarried blacks. Beginning in June, 1975, single blacks were admitted, but a strictly enforced rule proscribing interracial
dating and marriage was adopted.4
On January 19, 1976, the IRS revoked the University's taxexempt status, making the revocation effective from December
1, 1970. Bob Jones then filed FUTA (Federal Unemployment Tax
Act) returns for the period covering December 1, 1970, through
December 31, 1975, and paid a tax of $21.00 on one of its
employees for 1975.5 When the University's request for a refund
' Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1981)
(reh. and reh. en bane den., April 8, 1981). The University's Preamble, as contained in its certificate of incorporation, provides in part:
The general nature and object of the corporation shall be to conduct an
institution of learning for the general education of youth in the essentials of culture and in the arts and sciences, giving special emphasis to
the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures,
combating all atheistic, agnostic, pagan and so-called scientific adulterations of the Gospel....
Id at 148-49 n.1.
639 F.2d 149. The change in the University's policy after May 29, 1975, was
prompted primarily by the Fourth Circuit's decision in McCrary v. Runyon, 515
F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (reh. den., May 29, 1975), affd 427 U.S. 160 (1976), holding
that private, non-sectarianschools were prohibited, pursuant to the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1977), from barring qualified students
solely on the basis of their race. Prior to 1971, the University excluded all blacks.
6 Bob Jones University v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D.S.C. 1978)
(Chapman, J.). In 1971, following the first announcements by the IRS that it would
revoke the tax-exempt status of discriminatory schools, the University sued to
enjoin the Service from taking such action. In Bob Jones University v. Connally,
341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971), the district court rejected the assertion that such a
suit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 7412(a) (1976). The Fourth Circuit reversed, Bob Jones University v. Con-
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was denied, it sued to recover the sum of $21.00. The IRS
counterclaimed to recover approximately $490,000 allegedly due
on the returns filed by Bob Jones. The district court granted the
University's motion to sever, for a separate trial, the particular
tax status issue presented by its complaint.' Thus, the district
court was concerned primarily with an examination of the propriety of the Services' revocation of the § 501(c)(3) exempt status
of the University, in light of that institution's post-May 29, 1975
policy of forbidding interracial dating and marriage by its
students.
Bob Jones asserted that it qualified as an exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8). It was alleged
that the IRS action exceeded the authority delegated to it by
Congress, and that the revocation was violative of the University's rights under the first and fifth amendments to the United
States Constitution.7 The IRS, on the other hand, argued that
the legislative intent underlying § 501(c)(3) requires that in order
to qualify for an exemption, the organizations listed therein be
"charitable" in the broad common law sense. It was asserted
that such organizations, in order to properly be classified as
charitable, must serve the general welfare and be beneficial to
the community. Having concluded that the University's policies,
both before and after May 29, 1975, were racially discriminatory
and thus contrary to clearly defined public policy, the Service
asserted that it was compelled to revoke the school's § 502(c)(3)
exempt status.'
Central to the district court's holding that the IRS revocation of the University's exempt status was unjustified, was its
nally, 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973), and was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974). Although
the Supreme Court held that the injunction action was barred by § 7421(a), it was
suggested that Bob Jones might obtain judicial review of the revocation by paying an installment of the tax, exhausting all administrative refund procedures,
and then filing suit to compel a refund pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7422 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(1) (1976). 416 U.S. at 746. "The degree of bureaucratic control that ...
has been placed in the Service over those in petitioner's position is susceptible of
abuse, regardless of how conscienctiously the service may attempt to carry out its

responsibilities." Id. at 749-50.
468 F. Supp. at 893.
' Id at 895-96.
Id at 896.
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determination that Bob Jones is primarily a religious rather
than an educational institution. It was observed that the Services' post-1970 policy was concerned only with the exempt
status of discriminatory educational organizations. Moreover, inasmuch as there is no clearly defined federal policy against
racial discrimination by religious organizations, the granting of
exempt status to Bob Jones could not be viewed as being in
derogation of public policy.9
The district court's constitutional analysis was largely confined to the University's post-May 29, 1975 policy of admitting
blacks but barring interracial dating and marriage." The court
held that the revocation of the University's exempt status after
that date occurred as a direct result of the institution's practice
of genuine religious beliefs, and that such revocation was
violative of the University's rights under the free exercise
clause of the first amendment." The IRS argument that it had a
countervailing and compelling interest in seeking to discourage
discrimination on the basis of the race of one's companions or
associates was rejected.12
The government's interpretation of § 501(c)(3) was also found
to violate the establishment clause of the first amendment
because its primary effect was "the inhibition of those religious
'Id. at 897.
'0"The Court need not rule on this constitutional claim in relation to plaintiff's admissions policy earlier that year, because the question is more sharply

presented for the time period after May 29, 1975." Id. at 898.
" Id- The court cited and relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), where the Court ruled that: "Government
may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief . . . nor penalize or

discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views
abhorent to the authorities .. .nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the
dissemination of particular religious views .... Id. at 402. The district court then
held that: "Once plaintiff opened its doors to single blacks on May 29, 1975,
regardless of whether it be classified as a religious or educational institution, the
defendant's revocation of its tax exempt status violated plaintiff's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion." 468 F. Supp. at 899.
1 The IRS cited the cases of McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
(holding a Florida criminal statute prohibiting interracial cohabitation violative of
the fourteenth amendment), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking
down a Virginia miscegenation statute), as reflective of judicial recognition of the
validity of such an interest on the part of the government. These cases were
distinguished by the court because each was found to involve state action, an element which the court found lacking in the facts before it. 468 F. Supp at 899.
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organizations whose policies are not coordinated with declared
national policy and the advancement of those religious groups
that are in tune with federal public policy." 1 With respect to the
issue of the "entanglement," the court endorsed what was
perceived as the "benevolent neutrality" of across-the-board exemptions for religious organizations, 4 and deplored the continuous monitoring of religious practices necessitated by the
IRS policy."1
Finally, the district court turned to the question of whether
the formulation by the IRS of its policy for applying § 501(c)(3)
went beyond the authority delegated to it by Congress. It was
observed that the government had acknowledged that there was
no support for its position in the language of the statute. The
court pointed out that the word charitable, in the statute and in
the Treasury regulations,"6 is not used to modify the other
classes of organizations enumerated there, but rather is itself
one of a total of seven categories of organizations. Thus, the
court held that to be exempt, a religious organization need not
also be charitable in the common law sense. 7 While recognizing
that the courts have, on occassion, refused to read a statute
literally when to do so would directly contravene public policy,18
the court held that: "The relationship between plaintiff's exemp1,Id. at 900. The court found that this governmental policy was in conflict
with the second prong of the three prong standard established in Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971): "First, does the Act reflect a secular legislative
purpose? Second, is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion?
Third, does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement with religion?" Id. at 678. See Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973).

" The Fourth Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Waltz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), which held "[T]here is no gneuine nexus be-

tween tax exemption and establishment of religion." Id. at 675. The Supreme
Court further ruled that "[t]he limits of permissible state accomodation to religion
are by no means coextensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 673.
11468 F. Supp. at 901.
" 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)-(2) (1976).
, 468 F. Supp. at 901-02.
18 Id. at 902 (citing Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958));
Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C.
1977)); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971)). The opinion in Green,
wholly antithetical to the reasoning of the district court in Bob Jones, was heavily

relied upon when Bob Jones reached the Fourth Circuit. 639 F.2d at 150.
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tion and a national public policy against discrimination is simply
too remote." 9 Thus, it was held that the government's revocation of the University's exempt status was improper on both
statutory and constitutional grounds.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the decision of the district
court was reversed. 2 Judge Hall, writing for the court, first addresssed the question of whether the IRS had the statutory
authority to revoke the tax-exempt status of the University.
Characterizing the district court's analysis as "simplistic," it
was asserted that that court had torn § 501(c)(3) "from its
roots."'" Relying for support largely upon the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Green v. Connally,2 Judge Hall was quick to embrace the
argument that § 501(c)(3) cannot, and should not be divorced
from "its background in the law of charitable trusts .... , 23 The
court then quoted from one portion of the legislative history of
the statute: "The exemption from taxation ... is based upon the
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of
revenue by ... the benefits resulting from the promotion of the
general welfare. 24
Implicit in the court's reasoning is the proposition that
organizations whose policies are in conflict with public policy to
one extent or another are perforce of no benefit to society, and
cannot be viewed as promoting the "general welfare. '21 In
response to this same argument, when made by the IRS below,
the district court observed that the University, despite its
policy forbidding racial mixing, was of considerable benefit to
the community through its educational and other programs.
Writing for the district court Judge Chapman viewed this argument as being especially persuasive in light of the University's
post-May 29, 1975 policy which provided for the admission and
468 F. Supp. at 903.
Bob Jones University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147. The panel of the
Fourth Circuit which considered the government's appeal consisted of Circuit
Judges Widener and Hall and District Judge Merhige, sitting by designation.
Judge Widener dissented.
21 Id. at 151.
330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971).
639 F.2d at 151.
2, Id (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1820, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939)).
25id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss3/7

6

1982]

et al.: Survey of Developments in the Fourth Circuit: 1981

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

equal treatment of all blacks. 6 The efficacy of the view that
organizations whose policies are in any way out of tune with
public policy are not charitable and thus not eligible for taxexempt status, was questioned by Judge Widener who, in his
dissent from the holding of the circuit court, joined Congressman Ashbrook in noting that the Service has chosen to
leave "unhampered tax-exempt organizations which practice or
promote witchcraft, homosexuality, abortion, lesbianism, and
euthanasia...."27
In Judge Hall's opinion, two interrelated public policies
were violated by the University's admission practices: First, the
broad policy against racial discrimination generally, and second,
the specific government policy against subsidizing racial
discrimination in education.' The district court, by viewing Bob
Jones as primarily a religious organization, avoided the latter
issue entirely. The former issue, of course, arises with more
clarity in the University's pre-May 29, 1975 policy than in the
policy existing after that date. Judge Chapman skirted the problem for the most part by focusing his analysis on the last seven
and one half months of 1975.
The circuit court's treatment of the general discrimination
issue is inadequate as well. After noting that the pre-May 29,
1975 practice violated public policy because it subjected blacks
to restrictions not imposed on whites,2 the court turned to a
consideration of the University's later policy which simply
barred interracial dating and marriage. Adopting the government's argument which had been rejected below, the court held
1 468 F. Supp. at 904 n.8. "Defendant seems to imply that a change in plaintiff's policies to conform to defendant's guidelines would transform the religious
organization from one that did not benefit the public into one that did, although
the function and purposes of plaintiff remain unchanged throughout." Id.
" 639 F.2d at 161.
Id at 151.
Id. at 151-52. The court cited its earlier decision in Bob Jones University v.
Roudebush, 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1979), affirming the district court holding in
Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), that denial of
veteran's benefits to students attending Bob Jones was proper under title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1964). Also cited was the
Supreme Court decision in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1975), which held
that "the equal right to contract provision," of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1977), prohibited
racial discrimination in private school admission practices.
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that the Supreme Court's decisions in Loving"0 and McLaughlin1
were sufficiently analogous to be determinative of the case at
hand. It was stated that these decisions were indicative of a
broad public policy against discrimination "on the basis of racial
affiliation or companionship....

."I' The

court was apparently not

troubled by the fact that Loving and McLaughlin involved state
statutes which imposed criminal sanctions for interracial marriage and cohabitation respectively.
Both the district court and the circuit court discussed the
applicability to this case of the Supreme Court's decision in
Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner.3 There it was held that
allowing the taxpayer to deduct fines paid for violating state
gross vehicular weight laws as ordinary and necessary business
expenses would "frustrate sharply defined state policy ... , The
district court found that the nexus between Bob Jones' exemption and the frustration of public policy was too remote to bring
it within the Tank Truck doctrine. Judge Hall, on the other
hand, considered that so narrow an application of that doctrine
was unjustified given the compelling nature of the public policy
against racial discrimination. 5
The circuit court next considered the University's argument
that revocation of its tax-exempt status violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Judge Hall stated that "the
question remains one of balancing-giving due consideration to
the weight of the interests asserted by the government and the
extent and nature of the burden on the religious practice and
the religion as a whole.""0 Noting that the government interest
in discouraging racial discrimination in any guise is one of the
highest order, the court also found that any infringement of the
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
s McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
639 F.2d at 152.
.

356 U.S. 30 (1958).

Id.at 31.
639 F.2d at 152. In Tank Truck it was observed that: "This is not to say
that the rule as to frustration of sharply defined national or state policies is to be
viewed or applied in any absolute sense.... [Tihe test of nondeductability always
is the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the
deduction." 356 U.S. at 35. The Court noted that a flexible standard is essential in
order to accomodate the competing interests.
Id. at 153 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
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University's rights under the free exercise clause resulting from
revocation of its tax-exempt status would be minimal. Judge
Hall pointed out that revocation would not prevent Bob Jones
from adhering to its policy, and that no individual would be
forced to compromise his personal beliefs. The court held that
"these factors tip the balance in favor of the Services' non' '37
discrimination policy.
The holding by the circuit court that the government interest at stake overshadowed the University's free exercise
argument proved equally dispositive of the assertion that the
IRS policy would lead to unconstitutional "establishment" of certain religions as well as impermissible entanglement in religious
practices. While agreeing that "the Government must maintain
an attitude of neutrality toward all religions," the court held
that "certain governmental interests are so compelling that conflicting religious practices must yield in their favor."38 The
court's analysis of the interplay between the free exercise and
establishment clauses is abbreviated at best, and fails to come to
grips with the conflict inherent in seeking to accomodate the interests protected in each of those clauses. 9
Neither the district court nor the circuit court distinguished
adequately between the constitutional issues raised by the
University's pre- and post-May 29, 1975 policies. The government acknowledged that the proscription by Bob Jones of interracial dating and marriage resulted from a genuine religious
belief." Thus, this case presented a conflict between the
transcendent values protected by the first amendment, and the
well established public policy against racial discrimination- but
in two entirely different $ettings. Prior to May 29, 1975, when
Bob Jones was excluding all unmarried blacks, the exercise of
its religious beliefs resulted in a direct and substantial frustration of public policy. Subsequent to that date, however, blacks
=

639 F.2d at 153-54.
Id. at 154.
This conflict was recognized by the Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970): "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the
other." Id. at 668-69.
40 639 F.2d at 156.
3'
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were not barred from enrolling in the University. Rather, the institution adopted a formal rule which was the very embodiment
of one of its religious tenets.
The circuit court, for purposes of its balancing test, apparently viewed the above institutional policies as equally incompatible with public policy. To equate each of the University's
policies for the purpose of weighing them individually against
the government interest involved here was arguably wrong.
With respect to the policy after May 29, 1975, the first amendment issues were much more prominent, and the frustration of
public policy correspondingly less significant than had existed
with the policy preceding that date.
As was stated previously, the district court confined its
analysis largely to the post-May 29, 1975 policy and to the issues
raised by the University's claim for a refund of the tax paid by it
for one employee during that year. Similarly, Judge Widener,
dissenting from the holding of the Fourth Circuit, stated that
the court need only be concerned with the University's adoption
of the rule barring interracial dating and marriage, and the effect of enforcement of that rule on the school's tax-exempt
status.4 1 In reversing the district court, however, the Fourth
Circuit not only ordered that the University's claim for a refund
of 1975 FUTA taxes be dismissed, but that judgment be entered
for the government on its claim for the years 1971 to 1975." This
holding, which goes far beyond the issues dealt with by the
lower court, is further evidence of the court's failure to
recognize that, for purposes of constitutional analysis, the issues
raised by the University's claim were vastly different from
those inherent in the goverment's counterclaim.
While much of Judge Widener's dissenting opinion tracks
the arguments espoused by the lower court, he articulated much
more forcefully the view that the IRS had overstepped the
bounds of the authority delegated to it by Congress. It was
argued that Bob Jones is primarily a religious organization; that
the plain meaning of § 501(c)(3) is that such organizations are to
" "In the case before us, we are immediately dealing only with whether or
not Bob Jones' rule forbidding interracial dating and marriage may be enforced
without losing its tax exemption." Id
" Id at 155.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss3/7

10

1982]

et al.: Survey of Developments in the Fourth Circuit: 1981
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

be granted tax exemptions; and that there 'is no persuasive
authority to support the proposition that the service should be
allowed to usurp congressional power by effecting substantive
changes in the IRC indirectly, through enforcement, when condirectly, through amendment or
gress has not seen fit to do so
4
1
legislation.
new
of
enactment
Additionally, Judge Widener pointed to the Ashbrook
Amendment 44 as the most recent statement of congressional intent with respect to the enforcement of § 501(c)(3). The amendment, passed in the wake of IRS proposals to promulgate new
and more stringent rules and procedures for enforcing its nondiscrimination policy, states in part:
Sec. 103. None of the funds made available pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be used to formulate, or to carry out
which would cause the loss of
any rule, policy, procedure ....
tax-exempt status to private, religious, or church-operated
schools under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 unless in effect prior to August 22, 1978.Judge Widener viewed this language as a mandate that the
IRS cease doing, as of August 22, 1978, precisely what it did
with respect to Bob Jones in 1976. He argued that, notwithstanding the prospective operation of the amendment, it provided a clear statement of the intent of Congress to initiate a
moratorium on revocation actions such as that which was instituted against Bob Jones. This interpretation of the amendmelit is suspect. The only mandate contained therein is that the
Service not use any of the newly appropriated funds to promulgate or carry out any rules and procedures not in effect as of
August 22, 1978. Even a cursory examination of the procedural
guidelines established by the IRS between 1972 and 1975"
reveals that they would support the Services' decision to revoke
Bob Jones' exempt status at least for the period preceding May
29, 1975. There is nothing in the Ashbrook Amendment which
would hinder enforcement of those measures.
" Id at 158
" Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act,

Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559 (1980).
" Id at 562. See Note, The JudicialRole in Attacking RacialDiscrimination
in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979).
" Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834; Rev.
Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 75-50, '1975-2 C.B. 587.
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It is true, on the other hand, that the Amendment does
reflect congressional disenchantment with the course being pursued by the IRS. Certain remarks by the House Committee on
Appropriations demonstrate that the significance attached to
the Ashbrook Amendment by Judge Widener was not entirely
ill-advised:
The responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to enforce
the tax laws. The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service procedures ought to be to clarify these laws, not to expand them.
The issue of tax exempt status of private schools is a matter of
far reaching social significance and the Service ought to issue

revenue procedures in this area only when the legislative intent
is fairly explicit."
In summary, it bears repeating that the constitutional
analysis by both the district court and the circuit court was inadequate. By treating the University's successive policies as one
continuous and homogeneous entity, the Fourth Circuit ignored
the very unique problems presented by the post-May 29, 1975
policy. The precedent established here is of considerable importance. Totally aside from the important constitutional questions
which were left unanswered in this opinion, the court endorsed
the IRS's somewhat grandiose concept of its own authority and
power. Given the enormity of the Services' bureaucratic sprawl
and the pervasive manner in which it affects virtually every
facet of our lives, such an endorsement is of no small moment.
David D. Johnson, III
II. Daly v. Commissioner
Internal Revenue Code § 262,18 states that a taxpayer's personal, living, and family expenses are generally not deductible
from gross income. It is equally well settled that the cost of
traveling to and from work is a nondeductible personal expense."
"

House Committee on Appropriations, H.R. Rep. No. 96-248, 96th Cong., 1st

Sess. at 14-15 (1978).
26 U.S.C. § 262 (1976), provides, "Except as otherwise expressly provided
in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
" Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1972) (All taxpayers shall bear the
cost of commuting to and from work without receiving a deduction for that expense); Accord Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952). In Car-
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However, § 162(a)(2)1 of the Code allows a taxpayer to deduct
certain traveling expenses incurred while away from home on
business. The purpose of this provision is "to mitigate the
burden of the taxpayer who, because of the exigencies of his
trade or business must maintain two places of abode and
thereby incur additional and duplicate living expenses."5' 1 The
Supreme Court held in Commissioner v. Flowers,5 that three
conditions must be satisfied to qualify a taxpayer's traveling expenditures for a deduction under § 162(a)(2): (1)the expenditures
must be reasonable and necessary; (2) they must be incurred
while away from home; and (3) they must be incurred in pursuit
of a trade or business. In Daly v. Commissioner54 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with deciding whether
certain travel expenses were incurred "while away from home"
with respect to a traveling salesman who maintained his
residence at a place outside his assigned sales territory.
ragan Judge Frank explained why commuting expenses were personal expenditures:
A nation of city-hoppers and suburbanites though we may be, the
Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to say that traveling expenses
are incurred in pursuit of business when they stem from the petitioner's
refusal to bring his home close to his job. The job, not the taxpayer's
pattern of living, must require the travel.
Id. at 249.
1, Sec. 162(a) In general-there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business, including(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravegant under the circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business;
at Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 557, 562 (1968).
326 U.S. 465 (1945).
SId. at 470. Flowers involved an attorney who resided in Jackson,
Mississippi but had his place of employment in Mobile, Alabama. The Court held
that a taxpayer could not establish his home in one city, accept permanent
employment in another, and then deduct as business expenses while away from
home his traveling expenses incurred going to and from his place of employment.
In so holding the court explained that, under the circumstances, the expenses incurred were not connected with his employer's business but instead were personal living expenses because they resulted from taxpayer's decision to maintain
his residence in a place other than that in which his employer's business was
located. Id. at 472-74.
" 631 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1980).
52
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Lee E. and Rosemarie H. Daly, husband and wife, have been
residents of McLean, Virginia since 1960.11 In 1965 Lee Daly accepted a position as a furniture salesman for the Myrtle Desk
Company of High Point, North Carolina." His assigned sales territory was the tri-state area around Philadelphia, which included
Delaware, New Jersey, and eastern Pennsylvania. 1 The Myrtle
Desk Company did not require Daly to live within his sales
district. Thus, to avoid the loss of Mrs. Daly's job" and the inconvenience of moving, Daly and his wife continued to reside in
McLean. There Daly maintained an office where he prepared
sales reports and other incidental paperwork. 9 By far, however,
the greater part of his working time was spent in his sales territory; more particularly, the Philadelphia vicinity."
Daly's employer did not reimburse him for his expenditures
incurred while traveling between McLean and his sales region."
On his 1975 tax return Daly deducted these costs under §
162(a)(2). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed most
of the deductions based on the determination that Philadelphia
was Daly's "home" for purposes of § 162(a)(2).2 Thus, the expenditures were not incurred while away from home as contemplated
by that provision. Daly's deductible travel expenses, if any, said
the Commissioner, had to be computed with Philadelphia as the
point of departure rather than McLean."
Daly disputed the Commissioner's ruling before the Tax
Court, where the position of the Commissioner was upheld.64 The
court defined "home" as used in § 162(a)(2) (hereinafter referred
Ldat 352.
sIc
Id. Mrs. Daly was employed as a manager of the Georgetown Uniform
Company in Washington, D.C.
1 Id Neither Daly nor his employer maintained an office in the Philadelphia
area. Daly's business card listed his McLean residence as his business address.
Daly testified that selling was 85 percent of his job. Daly v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. 190, 196 (1979). "[Daly's] usual weekly business itinerary in 1975 was to
leave McLean early Tuesday morning, stay overnight in his territory for two
nights (Tuesday and Wednesday) and return to McLean late Thursday night." Id.
at 193.
" 631 F.2d at 352.
2 72 T.C. at 194.

63 Ida

"Id- at 190-98.
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to as tax home) to mean, "the vicinity of a taxpayer's principal
place of employment [or business] and not the place where his
personal residence is located, if different from the principal
place of employment. 8 5 The court found that Philadelphia was
Daly's principal place of business based on the concentration of
his sales activity there.66 Thus, the Tax Court agreed with the
Commissioner that Philadelphia was Daly's tax home.
The court next considered whether the additional travel expenses caused by Daly having his residence at a location away
from his principal area of employment were necessitated by the
demands of his business or whether they resulted from Daly's
personal choice to maintain his residence in one area while
working in another.67 The court deemed the maintanence of an
office in McLean to be unnecessary to the performance of Daly's
primary job of selling furniture. It found that Daly's reasons for
residing in McLean were personal and "unrelated to the exigencies" of his and his employer's business." Thus, the court determined that the added cost of travel to and from McLean was a
nondeductible personal expense.69
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Tax Court's decision
was reversed.7 1 Judge Hall, writing for the majority of a three
judge panel, restricted the court's inquiry to whether
Philadelphia should be considered Daly's principal place of
business and thus his tax home." The Fourth Circuit concluded
Id. at 195.
Id. The court explained the conduct of Daly's business:
Out of a total of 126 trips to locations in his sales territory in 1975 ...44
percent (55 of 126) were to Philadelphia itself or locatons within 28 miles
of Philadelphia, 66 percent (93 of 126) were to locations within 88 miles
of Philadelphia. In contrast, only 6 percent (7 of 126) of his sales trips
were to locations as near as 85 miles from McLean, Va . . .[Daly's]

McLean office work was no more than incidental to the other, more im-

portant part of petitioner's job (making sales solicitations of customers),
and we have not been shown why all of the paperwork could not have
been performed in the Philadelphia area, which can fairly be
characterized as the center of [Daly's] commission-producing business

activities.
Id. at 195-96.
87 Id. at 196.
"Id.

Id. at 198.

,0631 F.2d 351.
" Id. at 353.
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that concentration of business activity in a particular area is insufficient by itself to create a principal place of business.72 The
court distinguished the cases relied upon by the Commissioner
and Tax Court to supprt their holdings by the fact that they all
involved taxpayers who had an office or other means of conducting business in the area deemed to be their principal place of
business.7" Since neither Daly nor his employer maintained an office in Philadelphia, that city could not be considered as Daly's
principal place of business.74 Furthermore, the court held that
Daly had no principal area of employment and was therefore entitled to designate McLean as his tax home.75
The problem of determining the location of a taxpayer's tax
home has been the source of much litigation." Because of the
absence of any clarification from Congress as to the meaning of
"home" as used in § 162(a)(2), there is much disagreement among
the courts over its proper definition, and the controversy will
undoubtedly remain until the Supreme Court decides to hear an
appropriate appeal. 77 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit adhered
to the Tax Court's definition that a taxpayer's home is the vicinity of his principal place of business. 78 The rationale is that Congress, by enacting § 162(a)(2), expected a taxpayer to maintain
his home at or near his place of employment and only when he is
required by his business to travel away from such place are his
7
expenses for lodging deductible. In Barnhill v. Commissioner 1
the Fourth Circuit explained:
72

Id. at 354. See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465; Green v. Commis-

sioner, 35 T.C. 764 (1961), aff'd, 298 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1962).
" 631 F.2d at 353.
74 Id.
71Id. at 354.

§ 25.93 (1979).
Id The Supreme Court has consistently refused to define the meaning of
"home" as used in § 162(a)(2). In Commissioner v. Flowers, the Court avoided the
question by deciding the case under the "pursuit of business" requirement. 326
U.S. 465 (1945). Later, in Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 358 U.S. 59 (1958), the Court
again skirted the issue by saying it had not been raised in the lower courts. See
also Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287 (1968).
' Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945) (a state supreme
court judge may not deduct travel expenses incurred while traveling between
residence and the state capital sixty miles away).
76

See 4A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

9 Id.
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[I]t is not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended to allow
as a business expense those outlays which are not caused by the
exigencies of the business but by the action of the taxpayer in
having his home, for his own convenience, at a distance from his
business. Such expenditures are not essential to the prosecution
of the business and were not within the contemplation of Congress which proceeded on the assumption that a business man
would live within reasonable proximity to his business.",
There is a language in Barnhill to the effect that the court was
81
not willing to equate "home" with "principal place of business."
The court, perhaps recognizing the potential for unique factual
situations, may have intended to leave room for exceptions in
the future; or perhaps the court was merely recognizing the fact
that most persons do not reside on the premises of their place of
business. Although the court was reluctant to equate the two
terms for the purpose of determining the tax home, the court
did say in most cases the result would be the same.2
The determination as to where a taxpayer's principal place
of business or tax home is located is a question of fact and, while
the cases exhibit no easily discernible pattern, two considerations weigh heavily in judicial analysis. First, when a taxpayer
has more than one place of employment in a particular tax year,
the courts distinguish those places where the employment is of a
temporary duration from those that are of a permanent or indefinite nature. When a taxpayer accepts temporary employment84 away from his residence, his residence is considered to be
his tax home because it would be unreasonable to expect him to
move his residence to his place of employment given its temporary nature. 8 On the other hand, when a taxpayer has employ" Id at 917.
82

Id-

4A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.93 (1979).
Employment is temporary if its termination can be foreseen within a
reasonably short period. Id.
'3See

"

See, e.g., Burns v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1961). In Burns the tax-

payer resided in Williamstown, Ky. and was employed as a racehorse starter. His
employment contract required him to work various race tracks throughout the
country at the direction of his employer. During the tax year in question taxpayer
spent 155 days in Wheeling, West Virginia and 72 days in Hot Springs, Arkansas.
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ment of a regular, permanent or indefinite nature in a particular
location, it is reasonable to expect him to have his residence
close to such place of employment; therefore, his place of
employment is considered to be his tax home or principal place
of business.8 Second, when a taxpayer has more than one
regular (permanent or indefinite) place of employment in a particular tax year the courts look to the taxpayer's "center of
income-producing business activity" (hereinafter referred to as
"business center") to determine his principal place of business or
tax home.87 Factors relevant to this determination include: (1)
the length of time a taxpayer spends in each place of business,
(2) the degree of a taxpayer's business activity in each place, and
(3) the relative proportion of a taxpayer's income derived from
each place." Again, once the location of a taxpayer's "business
center" is determined, the question is whether it is reasonable
to expect him to have his hofie close to that location. In Daly
the Tax, Court applied the foregoing "business center" test to
hold that Philadelphia was Daly's tax home.
In a prior tax year taxpayer had worked tracks in Louisville and Keeneland (both
in Kentucky), Cascog, Rhode Island and Wheeling. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that taxpayer's employment at each location was seasonal and
therefore temporary. It was thus unreasonable to expect taxpayer to move his
residence close to his place of employment. See also Schreiner v. McCrory, 186 F.
Supp 819 (D. Neb. 1960).
" See, e.g., Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783 (1971). Tucker involved a
school teacher who resided in Knoxville, Tennessee with his family but accepted a
teaching position first in Alabama and later in North Carolina. The court held it
would be reasonable to expect him to move his family closer to his employment
where the nature of the job was not temporary and where the post of duty or the

principal place of employment was chosen by the employee himself rather than
his employer. See also Foote v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1 (1976); Kroll v. Commis-

sioner, 49 T.C. 557 (1968); Wills v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 308 (1967), aff'd, 411 F.2d
537 (9th Cir. 1969); Green v. Comissioner, 35 T.C. 764 (1961), affd, 298 F.2d 890
(6th Cir. 1974).

11See, e.g., Markey v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1974). In
Markey, the taxpayer traveled between Warren, Michigan, and Lewisberg, Ohio
each week. He maintained his home and spent his weekends in Lewisberg, where
he had established a consulting business and held several investments. He spent
the weekdays in Warren, using the facilities at General Motors' Technical Center.
The court reviewed the length of time the taxpayer spent in the two places, the
degree of his business activity in each place, and the relative proportion of his income derived from each. It deemed Warren his principal place of business and tax
home.
" See cases cited note 86 supra.
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The Fourth Circuit's opinion did not disavow the Tax
Court's "principal place of business" definition of tax home. In
fact, it applied it to hold that Philadelphia did not fit that definition. 9 In so doing, however, the court failed to consider seriously
the elements necessary to establish a principal place of employment. For no apparent reason the court of appeals rejected the
Tax Court's "business center" test as insufficient. Instead, as
previously mentioned, it considered the presence or absence of
an office to be the decisive factor. Such a holding is seemingly
wrong in light of the fact that Daly's job did not require an office. Had the performance of Daly's sales duties required an office it stands to reason the Myrtle Desk Company would have
provided him with one. More importantly, the court's reliance on
an office or headquarters can produce some absurd results,
under the circumstances presented, as Judge Sprouse noted in
his dissenting opinion:9
The majority's solution would just as well permit Daly to reside
in Nassau as in McLean. So long as he maintained no fixed
business address within his sales territory in the Northeast, he
could deduct the expenses of his travel to and from the Caribbean. I do not believe that Congress intended so to subsidize
the personal lifestyle of selected taxpayers. 2
Judge Sprouse's illustration manifests the fallacy of the majority's holding that Daly had no principal place of business whatsoever. At a minimum, it would seem, Daly had a principal place
of business consisting of his entire sales region.
To support its holding, the majority incorrectly relied on
Schreiner v. McCrory.3 That case involved an insurance consultant who had his home in Omaha, Nebraska, where his company's
home office was located but spent most of his work time and
earned a greater portion of his income in Denver, Colorado."
Both Nebraska and Colorado were within the taxpayer's sales
district which also included Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. 5 As in
631 F.2d at 354.
® 72 T.C. at 196.
631 F.2d at 354.
Id. at 355.
"

186 F. Supp. 819 (D. Neb. 1960).

Id at 821.
's

Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 7
[Vol. 84
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Daly, the taxpayer had no office or headquarters in Denver."
The District Court for the District of Nebraska held deductible
the taxpayer's cost of travel between Omaha and Denver.
There are two key facts in Schreiner. however, that make it inapplicable to Daly's situation. First, a close reading of Schreiner
discloses that Denver was merely taxpayer's temporary place of
employment. 8 Although the taxpayer spent most of his time
there during the tax year in question, he did not return to that
area every year. His company was in control of his sales
assignments which were subject to change at anytime. Daly's
sales assignments, however, remained the same each year. He
had 125 regular customers, most of whom were in the
Philadelphia vicinity.9 His business activity in that city was of a
more permanent nature. Thus, where it was not reasonable to
expect the taxpayer in Schreiner to move his home to Denver
given the temporary nature of his employment there, it was
reasonable to expect Daly to move his home to Philadelphia.
Second, the taxpayer in Schreiner resided within his sales
territory and in the same town as his employer's home office.
Omaha, for all practical purposes, was the taxpayer's principal
place of business in light of the uncertainty as to his travel
assignments. Daly, however, resided outside his sales district.
The majority overcame this problem by simply holding that
Daly had no principal place of business.' Such reasoning blinds
"Id
" The following passage from Schreiner manifests the temporary nature of
the taxpayer's business in Denver:
The evidence is not disputed that Mr. Schreiner's work was that of a
field consultant, policyholders' service, soliciting insurance, assisting in
the conservation of insurance and aiding in the obtaining of new insurance agents whenever and wherever he was assigned by his company. During the year in question Mr. Schreiner was directed to work
in the states of Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska and Kansas. During
the year 1954, Mr. Schreiner worked 248 days in the State of Colorado,
61 days in the State of Nebraska, and 20 days in the State of Iowa. The

evidence shows that ... his work was on a temporary basis in these
locations; that he registered as a guest with sleeping accommodations
on a daily basis only; and that he checked out of the particular hotel or
motel where he was staying when he returned to Omaha, Nebraska, on
business or for the weekend.
Id. (emphasis added).
72 T.C. at 191.
631 F.2d at 354.
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itself to the fact that Daly at least had a principal place of
employment represented by his entire sales region.
Once it is recognized that Daly's principal place of employment was, at the very least, his designated sales territory, the
true nature of his travel expenditures becomes clear. Daly's
situation is no different from that of a taxpayer who works in
downtown Philadelphia but for personal reasons chooses to
reside in an adjacent suburb. The latter's cost of commuting to
and from work is clearly a nondeductible personal expense
under § 262 of the Code. 101 Daly's circumstances, by virtue of his
residing at a greater distance from his place of business, do not
change the personal nature of his traveling expenditures. The
Fourth Circuit should have regarded those costs as nondeduct12
ible commuting expenditures.
By way of summary, the Fourth Circuit adheres to the rule
that a taxpayer's tax home is the vicinity of his principal place
of employment. The determination of the location of one's principal place of employment is a question of fact. In Daly the
Fourth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's "business center" test
as insufficient in itself to establish a principal place of business.
The court, ruling that an office or other means of conducting
business was a necessary requirement, held that Daly had no
principal place of business. Such a holding is untenable in a
situation like Daly's for it permits a salesman to reside
anywhere outside his sales territory and still be able to deduct
the added costs of traveling to and from his business area. The
101 See 326 U.S. at 470. In distinguishing commuting expenses from business
travel expenses the Supreme Court said in Flowers that "the exigencies of
business rather than the personal conveniences and the necessities of the
traveler" must require the travel. Id at 474. Daly's desire to reside in McLean
was solely out of personal convenience, as the Tax Court correctly found. 72 T.C.
at 196.
(1st
10 Bunevith v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 837 (1970), affd, 25 A.F.T.R. 70-935
for
agent
field
a
was
Bunevith
Daly.
from
indistinguishable
virtually
is
1970),
Cir.
the public school system in Massachusetts. His job was to inspect lunch programs

of schools in the Northeastern district of the state. Bunevith resided in central
Massachusetts outside his assigned territory. Like Daly, Bunevith had no office
or fixed locale within his district, nor did his employer require him to live within
it. Responding to a claim by Bunevith for the additional travel expenses attributable to his living outside the Northeast district, the Tax Court disallowed
such deductions on the basis that the expenditures constituted commuting expenses. 52 T.C. at 842.
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holding disregards that Daly, at the very least, had a principal
place of business consisting of his designated sales territory,
and the holding conflicts with the rule that commuting expenses
are nondeductible personal expenditures." 3
Thomas C. G. Coyle, Jr.
ADDENDUM

Subsequent to the writing of the above section on Daly the Fourth Circuit in
Daly v. Commissioner,48 A.F.T.R. 2d 81-6008 (1981) (en banc), upheld the earlier
Tax Court holding. Judge Sprouse, who wrote the dissent in the three judge
panel decision, wrote the majority opinion for the en bane court.

103For an able analysis of Daly and justification of its holding on social policy
grounds see Comment, 34 Tax Law. 829 (1981).
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
I.

RULE 23 STANDING UNDER TITLE VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 allows for persons
aggrieved by discrimination to sue in their own right. While
Title VII does not expressly provide for class actions, the courts,
however, have allowed them. In the landmark case of East
Texas Motor FreightSys. v. Rodriguez2 the Supreme Court held
that discrimination is usually a class problem by definition. The
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which deals with class actions in general must be met in every
case. The Court stated that a class representative must "possess
the same interest and suffer the same injury" as the members of
the class.3 This concept has become a separate Rule 23 "standing" requirement in Title VII cases.
Thus, in a Title VII case it becomes an issue whether the
named plaintiff has Rule 23 standing to represent the class when
class certification is sought in the early stages of the trial. A
split of authority has emerged on the proper standards for Rule
23 standing." The trial court must apply Rodriguez and require
that the plaintiff pass the ."same interest-same injury" test.
However, this phrase is not defined in Rodriguez and the formulation is without substantive content. For example, the same
interest may be defined as narrowly as the interest in promotions or as broadly as the interest in working in an environment
free of discrimination. Rodriguez did require that the plaintiff
pass the "same interest-same injury" test. However, this phrase
is not defined in Rodriguez and the formulation is without
substantive content. For example, the same interest may be
defined as narrowly as the interest in promotions or as broadly
as the interest in working in an environment free of discrimination. Rodriguez did not settle the conflict.
The Fourth Circuit first wrestled with this problem in Hill
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964).
431 U.S. 395 (1977).
MIdat 403.

'See 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. § 49.51 (1980).
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v. Western Elec. Co.,' In that case the named plaintiffs were
employees who alleged discrimination in promotions and job
assignments. A three judge panel' held that these named plaintiffs could not represent a class of victims of discrimination in
hiring. The court based the decision on Rodriguez, finding that
the interests of employees and job applicants were not the same.
The court also held that these named plaintiffs could not represent employees in a different facility who were drawn from a different labor market. Even though the injury may be the same,
employees in the Service Shop do not have a community of interests with employees of the Installation facility.
Although Hill read Rodriguez as requiring a restrictive approach to Rule 23 standing, the issue is not settled in the Fourth
Circuit. Three cases decided in 1981 have used markedly different analyses and interpretations of Rodriguez and Hill.
In Abron v. Black & Decker,7 the court, in a 2-1 decision, took
an extremely narrow view of the Rule 23 standing requirement.
A black woman brought a Title VII action alleging discriminatory treatment by her employer. She alleged that she was
denied a routine temporary transfer to light work when she
returned from medical leave. She also alleged across-the-board
employment discrimination and sought certification as a class
representative. The district court found racial discrimination
against the plaintiff and granted her relief on her individual
claim.
The district court also certified a class including all black
persons discriminated against by Black & Decker in "recruitment; job classification; hiring; assignment; promotion; transfer;
discipline; discharge; benefits; apprenticeship training programs; compensation; terms, conditions and privileges of
employment."' The plaintiff introduced statistical evidence to
show a class-wide impact of discrimination. Based on this
596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1979).

Before Judges Haynsworth, Lay, sitting by designation, and Russell. Judge
Haynsworth wrote the opinion, while Judge Lay concurred on the issue of stand6

ing.
654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981), before Judges Russell, Butzner and Murnaghan.
' Id at 952.
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evidence, the district court ordered the defendant to develop an
affirmative action program.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court affirmed the relief
granted to the plaintiff on her individual claim but set aside and
voided all class relief. In a per curiam decision, the court held
that Hill required that class members suffer precisely the same
injury as the class representative: Hill "is dispositive against
classs certification in this case on any ground other than that for
which plaintiff claims to have suffered injury (ie., temporary
ssignment for medical reasons to lighter work)."
The court characterized Abron's claim as unique and
solitary. Such a claim cannot support class certification. In fact,
the class as certified by the district court did not even include
an injury of the type suffered by Abron, denial of temporary
transfer. Therefore, the court held that the class was
erroneously certified and any relief based on such certification
was void. 10
Judge Murnaghan, in a robust dissent, argued that the right
to act as a class representative in a Title VII action should be inId. at 954.
problem of the "headless" class is closely related to Rule 23 standing.
The United States Supreme Court has approached this problem in terms of Article III mootness. In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), the Court held that when a
class is certified it acquires a separate legal status apart from the named plaintiff.
The mootness of the named plaintiff's claim after a class has been duly certified
does not render the class action moot.
In a footnote to Rodriguez the Court limited its holding in that case:
Obviously, a different case would be presented if the District Court had
certified a class and only later had it appeared that the named plaintiffs
were not class members or were otherwise inappropriate class
representatives. In such a case, the class claims would have already
been tried, and, provided the initial certification was proper and decertification not appropriate, the claims of the class members would not
need to be mooted or destroyed because subsequent events or the proof
at trial had undermined the named plaintiffs' individual claims. (citations omitted).
431 U.S. at 406 n.12 (1977). Thus, the holding in Abron appears ill-advised. Judge
Russell's position is that when the class is erroneously certified in the first place,
because the injury to the plaintiff is not the same as the the injuries to the class
members, then the court cannot grant relief to the class claims. But this reasoning conflicts with the language in Rodriguez which strongly implies that class certification is not improper merely because the named plaintiff is later found to not
be a clas!?.member.
O

10 The
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terpreted in a "highly remedial fashion."'" The dissent stated
that the majority's argument was flawed because the court
focused on the factual content of "injury" when all that is required is that each injury give rise to the same legal theory. The
dissent interpreted Hill as merely requiring that all class
members be employees, excluding applicants." The fact that the
class representative was never denied a promotion is not
critical. If the named plaintiff suffered some legal injury she has
Rule 23 standing to represent other employees that were
discriminated against in promotions. Moreover, the dissent
argued that even if Abron was an improper representative, the
class had a separate legal status and whether class relief was
proper was a distinct issue.
The same three judge panel decided Brown v. Eckerd
Drugs." However, an opposite result was reached. This time
Judge Murnaghan wrote the majority opinion and Judge Russell
filed a dissent. The plaintiffs, Brown and Black, claimed that
they had been discriminatorily terminated. In addition, they
were certified as representatives of a class of past and present
employees claiming racial discrimination in promotion and
transfer. Brown prevailed on her individual claim, Black did not.
The district court found against the defendant on the class
claims and rejoined the discriminatory promotion and transfer
practices.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendant contended
that the plaintiff did not have standing to represent a class concerning claims other than discriminatory discharge. The court
stated that Hill "did not preclude an employee who suffers some
particularized employment discrimination grievance from
representing other employees who present factually differing
claims that, nevertheless, proceed on the same legal theory of
race discrimination."'" Applying the same injury test, the court
stated that all employees suffer similar injury when employment practices expose them to a discriminatory work environment and the risk of denial of employment benefits. 15 Addition" 654 F.2d at 962.
1 Id at 968.
13No. 79-1821, slip op. (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1981).

Id at 16.
"Id at 18.
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ally, all employees have the identical interest in redressing such
discriminatory employment practices."6 Thus, the court adopted
a position directly contrary to the court in Abron. Since both
plaintiffs, at the time of certification, showed individual claims
and their subjection to discriminatory employment practices,
the court held that they were appropriate representatives of an
7
employee class.'
In his dissent, Judge Russell argued that, since the individual claims were discriminatory discharge and the class
claims were discriminatory promotion, allowing the individual
plaintiffs to represent the class violated the rule of Hill. The dissent interpreted Hill as requiring that the injury of the named
plaintiffs be precisely the same type as the injuries to the class
members.'8 The dissent recognized that there are two lines of
authority interpreting Rodriguez. One line allows "across-theboard" class actions, in which an injured employee may represent all persons affected by the employer's discriminatory
policies. The other view is that only those suffering the "same
impact" from discrimination as the plaintiff could be members of
the plaintiff's class. However, Judge Russell urged that Hill
committed the Fourth Circuit to the same impact approach. The
dissent also argued that the class claim should be dismissed
since it was improperly certified in the first place. 9
A third case, International Woodworkers of America v.
Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corp.,2 was decided by a different
three judge panel which rendered a unanimous decision. The
analysis used by the court falls somewhere between the two extremes represented by the foregoing cases. Four named plaintiffs, including the Union, sought to be representatives of a class
of all blacks and females who were victims of discriminatory
employment practices. The district court denied class certification, entered summary judgment against the individual plaintiffs and held that the Union did not have Article III standing to
litigate the claims of its members.
" Id at 19.
1,See supra note 10.
"

No. 79-1821, slip op. at 73.

1

See supra note 10.

No. 80-1162, slip op. (4th Cir. Sept. 17, 1981).
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On appeal to the Fourth Circuit the court held that the
Union did have Article III standing under the rule in Warth v.
Seldin2' allowing an association to litigate the claims of its
members. The court went on to hold that since the Union had
Article III standing to represent its members, it would be a proper class representative under Rule 23. The court stated that
Rodriguez does not prevent Rule 23 standing for the Union,
and although the Union as an entity is not injured it may seek to
redress the injuries to its members.2
The court denied Rule 23 standing to a white male plaintiff
because he obviously did not suffer any sex or race based
discrimination. However, the court noted that he was not claiming that he had been denied the benefits of interracial associations, or that he had suffered any form of retaliation. The court
also denied Rule 23 standing to a black female who admitted in
her deposition that she had never been injured by discriminatory practices.
A second black female, Dennis, alleged that she had been
discriminated against in her initial assignment and three other
separate incidents involving disparate treatment. The court
held that her initial assignment claim was time-barred,' but
reversed the summary judgment below on the other three
claims. In discussing whether she was a proper class representative, the court stated:
While it is true that a named plaintiff may not represent persons whose injuries resulted from employment practices different in kind or origin from those to which the plaintiff was
subjected ... where the interests of the representative plaintiff

coincide with those of the class members, Rule 23 does not require precise, mirror-image identity respecting the injuries
caused by a single practice or policy at a single facility.
Rodriguez did not 'destroy the utility of the class action device
by requiring separate suits on an episodic basis.' ... Obviously,
422 U.S. 490 (1974).
1 It should be noted that the possibility of Union class representation is important in those courts that narrowly apply Rodriguez to individual class
representatives. In such courts, an organization may be the only private entity
that could bring an across-the-board employment discriminaton suit.
I No. 80-1162, slip op. at 28.
21
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a single, unitary policy of disparate treatment might not injure
every affected person in exactly the same manner or degree.u
The court found that this case involved a unitary employer
policy in a single plant and held that Dennis' injuries were not
"so different from those of other blacks and women employed at
the same facility that she may not represent them in a class ac2
tion."
This holding seems to place the court among those who take
a permissive view of Rule 23 standing. However, the court went
on to hold that because Dennis' claim of initial assignment was
time-barred, she was not a proper class representative as to this
injury. The court ordered that on remand the district court
allow a proper plaintiff who claims such an injury to come forward. This analysis seems to place the court in the restrictive
camp as to Rule 23 standing.
In conlusion, there is much debate and confusion within the
Fourth Circuit concerning the scope of Rodriguez and Hill.
Litigants may get somewhat differing results depending on
which judges hear their cases. It is to be hoped that the Fourth
Circuit will make a definitive statement of its position on this
issue in an en banc decision. In the meantime it must be said
that no firm concensus exists in the Fourth Circuit as it relates
to standing under Rule 23.
Thomas R. Michael
II.
A.

PROBATIVE VALUE OF STATISTICAL PROOF

Introduction

In reviewing employment discrimination cases based on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act) the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has attempted to clarify
issues concerning the use of statistical proof. In both EEOC v.
American National Bank" and Patterson v. American Tobacco
Co.27 the court considered the probative value of various forms
at 24 (citations omitted).
at 26.
652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981).
634 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 8078 (1981).

24 Id.
25 Id.
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of statistical proof in relation to the establishment and rebuttal
of a prima facie case.
1. EEOC v. American National Bank
In American National Bank (ANB), the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged American National
Bank (ANB or Bank) with engaging in a pattern or practice of
racially discriminatory hiring practices.' The Eastern District
Court of Virginia found that EEOC had established a prima facie
case through the use of static work force statistics which
revealed a continuous underrepresentation of blacks in ANB's
work force generally and in the specific categories of office and
clerical employees, and managers. However, ANB successfully
rebutted this evidence by use of applicant flow data" and a
standard deviation analysis." In addition the court examined the
allegedly discriminatory hiring practices and evaluated thirtyone claimed examples of discrimination. The district court found
that the practices were legitimate and non-discriminatory in effect and that the employer, ANB, had not denied any of the
thirty-one individuals employment because of race.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the decision ruling that ANB's
standard deviation analysis was incorrect and the applicant flow
data was not specific as to the job categories in question because
it included service workers as well as clerical and managerial
employees. Thus the court of appeals held that, with the exception of one job category,31 the defendant's evidence was not sufficient to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case.
I There are two types of Title VII cases: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. In a disparate treatment case a plaintiff must prove intent to
discriminate. Proof of intent is not, however, required in establishing a prima
facie case in a disparate impact case. To prove discriminatory employment practices under a disparate impact theory, a plaintiff must establish that a facially
neutral employment policy or practice has a disproportionate impact or
discriminatory effect on members of a protected class. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
1 The Bank compared the percentage of black applicants for all job
categories and the percentage of blacks hired with the percentage of white applicants and white hirees.
3 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
The prima facie case was rebutted with respect to managers at the Suffold
branch.
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Pattersonv. American Tobacco Co.

In Patterson the court reviewed the district court's assessment of statistical evidence in light of Hazelwood School
District v. United States." The circuit court concluded that the
district court should reconsider the plaintiffs' use of general
work force statistics in establishing their prima facie case.
However, in order to determine whether general or special work
force statistics are probative for a given job category, the court
ruled that the district court must first determine whether the
job category in question requires special skills.
B.

Prima Facie Case under Title VI.

In both ANB and Patterson the plaintiffs relied heavily on
statistics to establish a prima facie case.' One common method
for establishing a prima facie pattern or practice in either a
disparate treatment or a disparate impact case is by presenting
statistical data indicating the employer's work force has a racial
or sexual composition significantly different than the relevant
work force in the community.-4 A case based on such data may
be bolstered by introduction of other evidence such as
discriminatory hiring practices or criteria or individual instances of discrimination. 3 A prima facie case is not, however,
the equivalent of a finding of discrimination. It merely raises the
inference that the defendant's actions, if not otherwise explained, were more likely than not based on a consideration of imper38
missible factors.
In a disparate treatment case the employer may rebut a
prima facie case by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

433 U.S. 299 (1977).
" The analysis of date may take many forms including standard deviation or
regression analysis. See SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.8 (1980).
1 See, e.g., Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Roman v. ESB,
Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d
543 (4th Cir. 1975).
Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089,
1096 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Page v.
Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 1981).
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reason for a refusal to hire or promote 37 or by showing that the
plaintiff's proof is "inaccurate or insignificant."'" The plaintiff
then has the opportunity of demonstrating that the reasons offered were mere pretext.3 9 But at all times the burden of proof
remains with the plaintiff who must show by the preponderance
of the evidence that the employer intentionally discriminated in
hiring or promotion on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.
Intent, however, is not an issue in establishing a prima
facie disparate impact case.4" Once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to show
that the employment decisions which had a disparate impact on
a protected class were based on a business necessity or a factor
permissible under the Act." Moreover, the employer must also
demonstrate that there are no less discriminatory practices
available to accomplish the stated purpose. 2
1.

The Relevant Work Force

Determining the relevant work force statistics is key to
establishing, or rebutting, a prima facie case based on statistical
proof. Under Title VII, if the job category requires skills not
possessed or readily acquired by the work force in general, the
court may hold that statistical disparities between the
employer's work force and that of the community are not probative. 3 In such cases, an employer's statistics making the relevant comparisons between the percentage of the work force
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at

360.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 804.
See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at 1095
(1981); Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2
(1978); Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d at 231.
" See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Robinson v. Lorilland Corp. 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). But see Furnco Construction Co. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425
(1975) (the Court seems to have weakened the standard).
" See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); accord James v. Stockham
Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1978); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
42See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 347 (1977);
EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1980)
" Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 308.
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with the skills needed and the employer's actual work force may
prima facie case based on general work force
rebut a plaintiff's
4
.
statistics
Both ANB and Patterson presented questions concerning
relevant work force statistics. The Fourth Circuit turned to the
Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood for guidance. In
Hazelwood the Court, in reviewing the hiring of teachers,
stated: "When special qualifications are required for particular
jobs, comparison to the general population ... may have little
probative value."4 There, the Court required a comparison of
the racial composition of the relevant portion of the defendant's
work force and the racial composition of qualified workers in the
relevant labor market. The Fourth Circuit has consistently applied this principle. 6 Thus, when confronted in ANB with the
plaintiff's comparison of blacks in the work force qualified for
management positions and the number of black managers
employed by ANB, the court concluded that the defendant's undifferentiated applicant flow data was not sufficient to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case as to that job category.
Patterson, however, presented a more complex situation.
One aspect of the controversy centered on whether the skills required by supervisors at American Tobacco Co. (American) were
analogous to those of teachers in Hazelwood or the truck drivers
in Teamsters. If American's supervisors possessed skills held or
easily acquired by the work force at large, the plaintiff's
statistical comparison could not be rebutted by American's data
which compared the percentages of women and blacks
categorized as supervisors in the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (SMSA) figures compared with the percentages
47
of women and black supervisors in American's work force.
" The proper comparison was between the racial composition of Hazelwood's
teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher

population in the relevant labor market.
433 U.S. at 308 n.13.
,8 See EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980); EEOC v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1980); Hill v. Western Electric Co.,
596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 577 F.2d 229 (4th

Cir. 1978).

" Since 1950 the U.S. census bureau, as part of the dicennial census has compiled additional information about the nation's metropolitan areas. This information includes labor force statistics which are divided into twelve general occupa-
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In EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co. 8 the Fourth Circuit
discussed the relationship between procedures for assessing
statistical data and the existence of special job classifications.
The court divided the cases into three categories.49 Categories
one and two include cases where the special qualifications do or
do not exist. These qualifications will be "manifest as a matter
of law from the mere identification by the plaintiff of the job
positions in question." 5 In these cases the proper work force
statistics for comparision should be obvious. In cases which fall
into the third category, where the existence of special qualifications are not "manifest as a matter of law," the burden is on the
defendant to establish the position does in fact require such
qualifications. 1
The court found that the supervisory positions in Patterson
fell into the third category. Both the district court and the court
of appeals accepted the appropriateness of the plaintiff's
general work force statistics under a pre-Hazelwood analysis.
As a result, there was no basis in the record for assuming that
the district court properly considered, and then rejected,
American's contention that special qualifications existed. The
case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings
on this issue.
In a concurring'opinion Judge Winter opposed the remand
on the basis that American permitted the Union to nominate
candidates for promotion, imposed no educational requirements,
required no showing of employee interest in the job, and had no
written guidelines for selecting supervisory personnel.
Moreover, he noted that American was given full opportunity on
the first remand to tender proof as to the special qualifications
it believed necessary, but continued to support its position with
statistical data with little relevance to the tobacco industry, i.e.,
tional categories which are further subdivided. In West Virginia, Parkersburg,
Wheeling, Huntington and Charleston are included in SMSA's. More information
about West Virigina statistics may be obtained from Ms. Carolyn Dempsey-Foss at
the Office for Research and Development, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506.
,8610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 185.
6 Id
"' Id. at 185 n.8. The burden of proof remains with the party with most ready
access to the relevant information.
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statistics derived from construction craftsmen, mechanics,
repairmen and machinists.
Regardless of the decision on remand, allowing an employer
to argue that a job with no educational requirements and no objective criteria does in fact require special skills will have implications for Title VII litigation. This notion, if extended, could
have been applied to the job category of the truck drivers in
Teamsters under the rationale that not everyone in the general
work force has or can easily acquire truck driving skills. An
employer may raise the issue of special qualifications to complicate and delay already complex and lengthy litigation.
Furthermore, the subjectivity of the factors used in hiring
and promotion may easily serve as masks for underlying
discrimination. In ANB, for example, it would be costly and difficult, if not impossible, to determine what percentage of
workers in the clerical category of the general work force
possess the ability to work with numbers, deal with the public
and have the integrity necessary to work as a bank teller. If it is
necessary to make such a determination in order to compare the
percentages of minorities and women in the relevant work force,
the burden of establishing a prima facie case would increase
significantly in class actions and pattern of practice cases.
2.

Applicant Flow Data

In ANB and Pattersonthe court discussed the use of applicant flow data. Generally, applicant flow data is another means
of establishing or rebutting a prima facie case under Title VII; it
compares the percentages of minority or women applicants
hired with the percentage of white or male applicants hired. Applicant flow data is usually considered highly probative of an
employer's actual labor pool.2 It has two advantages over static
work force statistics. First, the applicant flow data clearly excludes pre-Act hiring and promotion decisions. Both the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have emphasized that an
employer may not be held liable for pre-Act employment decisions even if such decisions were based on intentional
2 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977);

Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); United States v. County of Fairfax,
Va., 629 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1980).
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discrimination and resulted in an all-white or all-male work
force.5 3 Thus, pre-Act decisions must be excluded in an analysis
of work force statistics. Second, the use of applicant flow data
circumvents the necessity of determining the proper work force
categories to use in a comparison with an employer's static work
force statistics:
The court cautioned that applicant flow data must be sufficiently reliable. In ANB, for example, the court declared that
the defendants's applicant flow data failed to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case, citing two factors. First, the data did
not reflect all of the relevant applications. Only one year's
statistics were available for one of the branches and the number
of applications from the other branch varied so greatly from
year to year that there was an inference that not all applications
were part of the data base. The second factor was that the
Bank's data did not separate applicants for service worker positions from other job categories. The use of applicant flow data is
further restricted if minority or female applicants are discouraged by the employer's known discriminatory hiring practices or
by opening that are made known only by word of mouth.5
C. Statistical Significance
After a court has determined what statistical comparisons
are proper, the next step is to determine their significance.
There are two concepts relevant to the decisions in ANB and
Patterson.The first is standard deviation analysis. The second
is sample size.
1. Standard Deviation
Standard deviation 5 analysis is one method of determining
whether the disparity between general work force and an
employer's work force statistics is large enough to support an
" See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); United
Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977); EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147
(4th Cir. 1980).
1 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 330; Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. at 313 n.21; United States v. County of Fairfax, Va., 629
F.2d at 940 n.9.
I See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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inference of discrimination.5 The Supreme Court's decision in
Casteneda v. Partida7 created judicial confusion in the assessment of statistical evidence.58 In Casteneda the Court reviewed
data indicating extreme disparity between white and minority
members on jury panels and concluded: "As a general rule for
such large samples if the difference between the expected
number and the observed value is greater than two or three
standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing
was random would be suspect to a social scientist."59
0
The Fourth Circuit in EEOC v. United Virginia Bank"
(UVB) literally applied what it termed a "Casteneda-Hazelwood
analysis" of standard deviations. Relying on Casteneda, the
court characterized a standard deviation of 2.02 as
insignificant.8 However, in ANB, the Fourth Circuit corrected
its misuse and misunderstanding of the standard deviation
analysis applied in UVB.

In ANB, the district court had applied the standard deviation analysis to specialized work force figures, recording
generalized values for the number of standard deviations.
Because the number of standard deviations in the bank officials
and managerial employees category for any branch was never
above one or two and not above two or three in the clerical
category, except at the Portsmouth branch. The court found
that a prima facie case was established only for clerical workers
at the Portsmouth branch where the observed values, i.e., ANB's
work force statistics, were four to five standard deviations from
the expected values based on general work force statistics.
On appeal, Judge Phillips clarified the issue by defining and
explaining standard deviation.
Standard deviation is a measure of the predictable fluctuation in a random selection process. The difference
between the actual ("observed") numbers of the pro"S ee. e.g., note 33 supra and accompanying text; BALDUS & COLE,
(2d ed. 1979).
" 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
See, e.g., EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
430 U.S. at 496 n.17.
615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
',Id. at 152.

STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
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tected group in such a sample and the number that
would be "expected" in a perfectly proportional process
of selection from the appropriate pool can then be expressed in numbers of standard deviations. In turn,
standard deviations can be expressed in terms of
mathematical probability that chance is the cause of the
disparities measured. As standard deviations increase
numerically, the probability of chance as the cause of
revealed underrepresentation of course diminishes. 2
More specifically a standard deviation of ± 1.96 indicates
the probability that the statistical disparity resulted from
chance is not more than 5%. At ± 2.58 standard deviations the
probability is 1%. Thus, the court concluded, in accordance with
Casteneda, courts should be extremely cautious in drawing any
conclusions from standard deviations in a range of one to three.
However, where statistical disparities exist in this range a court
still may determine that a prima facie case of discrimination has
been established.
2.

Sample Size

The inferences which can be reasonably drawn from any
statistical analysis are partially dependent on the sample size.
In the employment context, sample size refers to the number of
hiring or promotion decisions made. Generally, the larger the
sample size, the greater the degree of confidence that may be
placed in the inferences drawn from the analysis. The Supreme
Court in Mayor of Philadelphiav. EducationalEquality League 3
cautioned that small samples may not support an inference of a
pattern of discrimination in employment decisions. Several
courts have refused to find that the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case when the sample included a small number of
employees or few employment decisions. 4 But, these courts
have offered no guidance as to how small is too small. That question is left to the "best judgment" of the lower courts. 5

' 652 F.2d at 1191.

63415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974).
" See, e.g., Morita v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, 541
F.2d 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977).
652 F.2d at 1194.
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In exercising that judgment in ANB, the Fourth Circuit did
not choose a technical approach. Nor did the court determine
which statistical analysis is most appropriate for the data
available or what sample size is relevant to the analysis and
facts of the case. Instead, it adopted a balancing approach. The
danger of unfairness to the employer in resting inferences of
discriminatory employment practices upon proof involving a
small number of employment decisions was weighed against the
problem of precluding proof of discrimination in circumstances
involving local employers with small work f6rces.66 The court
then found that ANB's hiring of two managers at the Suffolk
branch over a seven year period was too small of a sample to
support an inference of a pattern and practice of discrimination.
However, it did find the number (35) of hiring decisions in the
clerical category to be "quite sufficient."
D. Probative Value of StatisticalEvidence
Once the statistical significance of the employment data has
been determined, the court must then determine the weight
given to this evidence. In order to correctly assess the probative
value of statistical data it must be viewed with an understanding of its technical meaning and underlying assumptions as well
as an awareness of other evidence. In a discrimination case
statistical analysis merely indicates the probability that the sexual or racial composition of an employer's work force did not
result from random selection. The underlying assumption is that
if sex or race were not a factor in employment decisions, over
time the employer's work force would probably mirror the relevant work force in the community."'
Generally, the legal analysis applied is compatible with this
statistical approach. In disparate treatment cases the statistics
may create an inference that the employment practices of an
employer utilized race or sex as a factor. Although statistics
alone can be used to establish a prima facie case, the Supreme
Court in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters" cautioned that
e4Id.
"7International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20;
United States v. County of Fairfax, Va., 629 F.2d at 939.
" See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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establishing a prima facie case is not the equivalent of a finding
of discrimination. Rather it raises a rebuttable inference of
discrimination. 9
Pattern or practice cases involving disparate treatment
such as ANB raise unique questions of proof. Proof of disparate
treatment requires a showing of intentional discrimination."0
The nature of statistical proof, with its emphasis on probabilities rather than the outcome of any specific event, is not entirely compatible with the individual determinations inherent in
employment decisions and the need to prove intent. In ANB, for
example, the court declared that the plaintiff had proven a pattern and practice of discrimination without a showing that any
of the thirty-one persons identified as individual victims of
discrimination had, in fact, been discriminated against.
Theoretically, under the court's analysis, it would be possible to
conclude that, even if there were no proven acts of intentional
discrimination, ANB could be held liable for intentional
discrimination on the basis of statistical inferences.
The court in ANB discussed the relevance of non-statistical
evidence of discrimination. EEOC alleged that ANB used
subjective hiring standards in interviews conducted by an allwhite staff, relied extensively on friends and relatives of
employees for word-of-mouth recruiting, and gave preference to
those who were friends or relatives of bank employees.
Although the district court found that these hiring practices
alone or taken together were not discriminatory, the court of appeals found that, as a matter of law, the lower court's analysis
was in error. It found that if there is a statistical showing of a
racially unbalanced work force, the use of hiring practices are to
be assessed, not in isolation, but for their tendency to
perpetuate that imbalance. This is consistent with findings in
both Teamsters and Hazelwood where the Court viewed the
statistical evidence against the background of teacher hiring
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
70 See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 433 U.S. 324 (1977); Roman v. ESB,
Inc., 550 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1976); Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th
Cir. 1975). But see Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. United
Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980).
'
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practices in Hazelwood' and instances of specific discrimination
in Teamsters.2
Kathleen Abate
III.

SECTION 703(h) SENIORITY EXEMPTION

The decision in Pattersoninvolved not only statistical proof
in a .Title VIII disparate impact case, but the definition of bona
fide seniority plan under § 703(h) of the Act.73 The American
Tobacco Co. had two plans which they contended fell within the
scope of § 703(h). The first was a branch seniority system.74' The
second was a lines of progression policy. 8 The district court had
originally granted relief to a class of black employees which,
with some modifications, .was approved on appeal' Following
the entry of this judgment the Supreme Court decided International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States" and United
Airlines v. Evans7' The defendants, American Tobacco Co. and
,t In Hazelwood the school principal had almost complete discretion in hiring. Subjective factors such as ability to deal with people, personality, poise, voice
and articulation were given great weight.
I In Teamsters, government testimony included over forty personal accounts of individual discrimination.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority system ... provided that
such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
7' Under the branch seniority system employees lost their seniority if they
transferred to another branch or department. Seniority was determined by the
length of service on a departmental rather than on plant-wide basis.
" An employee becomes qualified for a job near the top of a given line of
progression by first holding a job nearer the bottom of that line. For example, in
order to become an adjuster it is necessary to be an operator then a learner adjuster. American had nine such lines that were identified as exceptions to the
branch senibrity system.
,1 The district court ordered: (1) the posting of more definite written job
descriptions when vacancies occurred; (2) elimination of the lines of progression
poliey in six out of nine categories; (3) blacks must be permitted to transfer between branches without loss of seniority; (4) back-pay awards to employees
unlawfully denied promotions; and (5) development of objective criteria for appointing supervisors. 634 F.2d at 747.
" 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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the Tobacco Worker's International, asserted that these decisions constituted significant intervening changes in the law and
moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for appropriate equitable
relief from the judgment.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed American's branch seniority
system and lines of progression policy to determine if either or
both were bona fide seniority systems with the meaning of
§ 703(h). The court held that the branch system, if it was "bona
fide" came within the exemption, but the lines of progression
policy did not.
A. The Branch Seniority System-The Question of Bona
Fide
The Fourth Circuit remanded the issue of whether the
branch system was "bona fide" and suggested the district court
look to the Fifth Circuit decision in James v. Stockham Valves
& Fittings Co. 9 for guidance. In order to determine whether
the seniority system was bona fide under § 703(h) the court in
Stockham, like the Court in Teamsters, focused on the issue of
intent and articulated four factors:
1. Whether the seniority system operates to discourage all
employees equally from transferring between seniority units;
2. Whether the seniority units are in the same or separate
bargaining units (if the latter, whether that structure is rational
and in conformance with industry practice);
3. Whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial
discrimination; and
4. Whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose."
In Teamsters the Court held that a facially neutral system
that did not have its genesis in a discriminatory purpose and
was not negotiated or maintained to intentionally discriminate
did not violate Title VII. The branch seniority system in
Teamsters was clearly originated and maintained for a
legitimate business reason. In Stockham, however, the seniority
system was adopted when racial segregation was standard practice in the South and continued until 1974 in a context of cornT

559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).

mId.at 351-53.
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pany policies promoting segregated facilities. Furthermore, the
branches of the racially segregated seniority system did not
reflect traditional industry bargaining units.
The situation in Pattersonlies between the clearly bona fide
system in Teamsters and what the court deemed as Stockham's
"intransigent adherence to widespread segregated facilities at
the plant."8 American's branch seniority system originated
before 1963 when the departments of its two branches were
racially segregated. In 1963 the departmental but not the
branch seniority system was abolished. The record is not clear
on the issue of whether the branch system was originated and
maintained free of purposeful discrimination. In Stockham the
court concluded the facts of a particular seniority system and a
case by case determination are critical. Both Stockham and Patterson were remanded to the district court. Although Stockham
was appealed, certiorari was denied. In Patterson it was
granted.2
B.

Line of Progression-Definitionof a System

The Fourth Circuit rejected American's assertion that its
lines of progression policy fell within the scope of § 703(h).
Because the policy was adopted after 1965 and thus not within
the § 703(h) exemption, the court held that the lower court properly applied a disparate impact test which focused on
discriminatory effect. Writing for the majority, Judge Phillips
stated "whether or not [the policy] be considered a 'seniority
system' . . . the policy was not in effect at American in 1965."
But in his dissent Judge Widmer held the view that this policy
was in fact initiated before 1965, the effective date of the act. If
the policy existed prior to 1965, the next step in the inquiry is to
81Id. at 353.
101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981). The Court has also granted certiorari in Swint v.
Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1972
(1981). In Swint the Fifth Circuit held that an employer's departmental seniority
12

plan was not a bona fide seniority system within the meaning of § 703(h). The
lower court ruling was based on the rationale that the seniority system locked
employees into a particular department, but it did so equally for both blacks and
whites and was based on industry practice. The court of appeals rested its decision on the determination that the employer had maintained segregated departments with no apparent reason except to separate the races.
m 634 F.2d at 748-49.
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determine whether that policy, as it existed before 1965, constituted a seniority system.
There have been few decisions" defining the scope of personnel policies which may constitute a seniority system under
§ 703(h). 5 The most recent Supreme Court case addressing this
issue is CaliforniaBrewers Association v. Bryant.88 Bryant, a
black worker, alleged that the requirement that an employee
work 45 weeks within one year in order to attain permanent
status operated to preclude him and other class members from
achieving or from a reasonable opportunity of achieving permanent status. Under the Brewers' multi-employer bargaining
agreement an employee with permanent status scheduled for
lay-off could "bump" temporary employees at any local plant.
New hirees were thus prevented from acquiring the time
needed to attain permanent status. Under this system no black
had ever attained permanent status in the California brewing industry.
The Court held that the 45 week requirement was a component of a seniority system within the meaning of § 703(h). The
collective bargaining agreement was interpreted as creating
two seniority ladders: one for permanent and one for temporary
employees. Citing both Teamsters and Evans, the Court emphasized that the routine application bona fide seniority plan
was lawful under Title VII even if it operated to freeze the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
Before CaliforniaBrewers, a seniority system appeared to
be limited to policies directly relating to length of service." In
California Brewers the Court, in a 4-3 decision with Justices
" See California Brewers Assoc. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, reh'g denied, 445
U.S. 973 (1980); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Chrapiliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
1 The statutory definition of system appears to include employer initiated as
well as union negotiated plans. This is based on the rationale that an employee's
expectations and vested rights are not diminished because the plan was adopted
through the employer's initiative. See Alexander v. Machinists Aero Lodge No.
375, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cer denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); EEOC v. E.I.

duPont Nemours & Co., 445 F. Supp. 223 (D.Del. 1978).
444 U.S. 598, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 973 (1980).
444 U.S. at 600.
See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
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Powell and Stevens abstaining, found that a seniority system
could shelter more than mere length of service. It reasoned: "In
order for any seniority system to operate at all it has to contain
ancillary rules that accomplish certain necessary functions but
which may not themselves be directly related to length of
employment."89 Industry custom was a factor in this determination. Because the decision was not made by the entire Court and
the difficulties inherent in applying the industry practice standard, California Brewers offers few guidelines for defining the
limits of a seniority system.
Since certiorari has been granted, the Supreme Court may
use Patterson and American's line of progression policy to
clarify what type of policies constitute a seniority system and
the degree of formality required before those policies are
designated as such. If American's "lines of progression" policy is
a seniority system, the issues before the Court may include the
question of whether a seniority system which had its genesis in
racial discrimination violates Title VII although the system may
have not been maintained in a manner which intends to discriminate.
Kathleen Abate
IV.

REMEDIES UNDER TITLE VII:

TERMINATION OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
The awarding of back pay is the remedy most often applied
in employment discrimination cases. An integral part of any
back pay award is determining when an employer's liability will
terminate. The Fourth Circuit confronted this issue in Ford
9
Motor Co. v. EEOC.
The case involved two separate acts of
discriinination under Title VII: one occurring in 1971 and involving three women, the other occurring in 1973 and involving
seven women.
In both instances, the district court found that if the women
had been hired they would have worked until the time of trial.
Back pay was therefore awarded for the entire time. Ford,
however, attempted to terminate its back pay liability at several
444 U.S. at 607.
645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981).
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points and also requested that unemployment compensation be
subtracted from the award. The Fourth Circuit rejected all of
Ford's contentions, thereby allowing back pay to continue until
the time of trial. Not only did the court allow back pay when it
arguably could have ended, but it also remanded for the consideration of additional relief.
With regard to the 1971 occurrence, Ford initially argued
that back pay should have ended when the women were recalled
(subsequent to Ford's discrimination) by their former employer,
General Motors (GM) in 1973. The circuit court held that since
the women were laid off from GM after one year, the job was
only a temporary one and therefore precluded the termination
of Ford's back pay liability.9 The court reasoned that victims
are to be made whole, and that limiting back pay to the time
when a temporary job was accepted would not accomplish this
since the back pay period would be shorter than the
hypothetical work history. 9' "It would be unjust to require [the
discrimination victim] to mitigate his damages to the greatest
extent possible but then to penalize him for substantial but
short-lived success." 93 Thus, if back pay were to end completely
upon the acceptance of equivalent employment, whether temporary or permanent, a victim would be discouraged from
mitigating damages. By holding that back pay liability did not
end when the plaintiffs accepted employment, the court reemphasized the underlying policies of Title VII of making victims whole, encouraging mitigation, and eliminating discrimination in the work place.
Judge Hoffman, however, disagreed. In his dissent,9' he
noted that it is well established that employment elsewhere cuts
off back pay if it is substantially equivalent and permanent. In
the present case, since the employment with GM was intended
to be permanent, it should have cut off Ford's liability. No
evidence indicated that the job was temporary, and the fact that
Interim earnings, however, were deducted.
The hypothetical work history was determined by the length of time that
the males, who were actually hired, had been employed. In the present case the
males were still employed at the time of trial.
645 F.2d at 191 (citing NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 179
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966)).
" 645 F.2d at 201.
"
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the women were offered a job with GM in another city
establishes that the positions were permanent. According to the
dissent, the determination of when back pay should end hinges
on whether the job taken was intended to be permanent, not the
actual result. Under this analysis, the goal of making victims
completely whole is outweighed by the possible heavy monetary
burden placed on the employer in employment discrimination
cases.
Ford's next contention was that its back pay liability should
have ended in 1973 when it offered permanent positions to the
women during the time they were employed by GM. In rejecting
this argument, the Fourth Circuit fully accepted the district
court's reasoning that the job offer would have forced them to
abandon their seniority at GM, and this they were not obligated
to do. "[A] refusal to commit seniority suicide is not an acceptable reason to deny back pay."95 Moreover,
Ford's job offer was tainted by the effects of the discrimination
it had practiced in 1971. [The women] could accept the offer only
by forfeiting the seniority they had accumulated at [GM] and
without a compensating offer of seniority at Ford to alleviate
the effects of discrimination against them in 1971.1
The court is not alone in this respect as this principle is followed
by three other circuits.9" In short, if an offer does not rectify the
effects of post-discrimination, the plaintiffs are under no duty to
accept it.
The dissent, however, points out that if Ford had offered
retroactive seniority rights to the women, the collective
bargaining agreement would probably have been violated. As
Judge Hoffman viewed the issue, neither Title VII nor the
Naional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) require back pay and
retroactive seniority in an offer of initial employment for the offer to be valid. The reason for this is that as long as the
employer does not condition the offer on the employee's giving
up back pay or seniority, the employer is under no duty to prom" 645 F.2d at 192 (citing UTU v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 340
(4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976)).

645 F.2d at 192.
9,Comacho v. Colorado Electronic Technical College, Inc., 590 F.2d 887 (10th
Cir. 1979); Claiborne v. Ilffinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1978); Jurinko v.
Edwin L. Weigand Co., 447 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S.
970 (1973).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

47

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 7
[Vol. 84
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ise such things, since the employee can accept the offer and then
pursue his other claims through judicial or administrative channels. Therefore, the employer would be released from back pay
liability when an offer is rejected.
Furthermore, Judge Hoffman contended, an award of back
seniority would be unfair to present employees and would
frustrate employer-employee relations. While Franks v.
98
Bowman Transportation
held that courts are not precluded
from ordering retroactive seniority, the dissent went on to
assert that this does not obligate an employer to voluntarily include such an offer. A problem with this approach is that an
employee may not be aware that she can accept the offer and
then pursue other means of receiving lost seniority. It would be
logical for her to conclude that it is an all or nothing situation;
that is, she must take what is offered and no more.
Moreover, there is no practical difference whether the
employee obtains her lost seniority up front with the job offer or
later pursuant to either judicial or administrative means. The
concern of Judge Hoffman, that retroactive seniority is unfair to
current employees, is not quieted by the award of retroactive
seniority after the employee is hired, rather than before.
There also seems to be little reason why the employee
should bear the continued burden of obtaining back seniority.
The dissent does, however, make a strong argument that the
failure of the discriminatees to object or complain to Ford about
the lack of seniority at the time of the offer indicates that they
turned down the offer for other reasons. For this reason they
should have been estopped from relying on this excuse.
Ford also argued that its back pay obligation should have
ended when the women plaintiffs entered a CETA nursing training program for the unemployed in 1975. The Fourth Circuit
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to terminate back pay. The court reasoned that the
workers still remained in the labor market and were "ready,
willing and available for employment."9 The CETA program
was treated as though it were employment since the women

424 U.S. 747, 762 (1976).
645 F.2d at 194.
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received a salary for time spent in the program."' The court
found that the women had signed up for the program only
because they were urged to do so by the unemployment office,
and but for Ford's discrimination, they would not have been
referred to the CETA program.
Once again a dissent was filed. Judge Hoffman, in citing a
Tenth Circuit decision,' asserted that a commitment to fulltime schooling was analogous to acceptance of a permanent job.
Schooling also displayed a definite intention to seek permanent
employment in the nursing field."2 Thus, Judge Hoffman would
have terminated the back pay award upon entry into the training program, if not sooner.
The Fourth Circuit also upheld the district court's holding
that unemployment compensation benefits received by the plaintiffs should not have been deducted from the back pay awards.
While noting that there is a split of authority over this issue, the
court reasoned that money received as unemployment compensation is part of an independent social policy. The court cited a
1951 Supreme Court case," 3 which held that there should be no
such deduction under the NLRA. "Since no consideration has
been given to collateral losses in framing an order to reimburse
employees for their lost earnings, manifestly no consideration
need be given to collateral benefits which employees may have
received."" 4 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit concluded that to
allow the deduction would undercut the corrective force of the
back pay award.
The dissenting opinion agreed with this in part, but opposed
the majority's per se rule prohibiting such deductions. Judge
Hoffman asserted that courts should be free to exercise their
discretion in determining this issue.
The district court also found that Ford had discriminated
against seven other female applicants in 1973. However, since
100Again, interim earnings were deducted from Ford's back pay obligation.
10 Id.at 209 (citing Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 267-68 (10th

Cir. 1975)).
102 645 F.2d at 209; see NLRB v. Ohio Hoist Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 14,15 (6th Cir.
1974).
10
104

NLRB v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
645 F.2d at 195 (citing 340 U.S. at 364).
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only one position was available at the time, the court awarded
each woman one-seventh of the back pay amount calculated from
the date of discrimination to the time of trial. Ford, in objecting
to the length of this back pay period, based its argument on the
fact that the male who was actually hired for the job was laid off
in 1974 and never recalled. Since in his place Ford hired a
female, the company contended its back pay liability should
have ended at that time. The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the
lower court, disagreed with the defendant's contention. In
order to accomplish the goal of making victims whole,
hypothetical employment histories are constructed to determine
the appropriate back pay period. Although the employment
history of the person actually hired is a good guide, it is not controlling. As the court stated, "[T]he focus is on the probable job
career of the victim, who is to be made whole, not on the career
of the actual employee, who is of course not a party to the Title
VII case."' 5 Because the failure to recall the male employee was
out of the ordinary, his work history was not an accurate indicator of the probable work history that one of the females
would have had.
Judge Hoffman would have terminated back pay when the
actual person hired was laid off. Hypothetical work histories
may be formulated when the actual successful applicant cannot
be specifically identified; for instance, in class action suits involving large-scale discriminaton over a long time. But when the
identity of the worker is known, the dissent noted that
hypothetical work histories are unnecessary.
However, the dissent seems to overlook that basing the
back pay award solely on the length of service of the successful
employee may not be entirely fair to the discrimination victim.
For instance, the male actually hired may have been laid off due
to inadequate job performance. This certainly should not
militate against the victim since it would have no bearing or
relation to the length of time that the individual discriminated
against may have held the job.
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for consideration of
further remedies. The court stated that not only do district
courts have broad discretion in formulating remedial orders, but
10 645 F.2d at 199.
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they are also obligated to grant the fullest relief possible to insure that the effects of discrimination are totally removed." 6 If
no other remedies are granted, then the district court must articulate its reasons. The appellate court also offered some suggestions on additional remedies such as granting the women hiring preference status with retroactive seniority." 7
Robert Goldberg

Id. at 206 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
,0, 645 F.2d at 200-01. The district court's duty is to grant victims of
discrimination the fullest relief possible "to insure that the effects of discrimination are totally removed from the lives of discrimination victims." Id (citing 422
U.S. at 418).
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CRIMINAL LAW
I.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In United States v. Ramapuram,' the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, by expanding the "open field" doctrine,2 validated a
warrantless search of the unlocked trunk of a "junked"
automobile parked in a farm field. An agent of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) received a report from a
state police detective that Ramapuram was responsible for the
theft of approximately one hundred sticks of dynamite earlier
that month, and that Ramapuram intended to blow up certain
public buildings. The detective's son had observed Ramapuram
and another individual load the dynamite into Ramapuram's
automobile.3
The agent interviewed the accomplice in the alleged theft
who told the agent that the dynamite was in the trunk of a
Chevrolet, which was parked in a farm field owned by
Ramapuram's father. Two agents from the ATF and two state
troopers found it parked in an open field at about 200 feet from
the main road. The car's license plate had expired, the doors
were unlocked and the trunk lock had been removed. The agent
opened the trunk and found eighty-eight sticks of the stolen
dynamite. No search warrant was obtained, and no effort was
made to contact a judge or magistrate to apply for a warrant.'
At trial, photos of the "junker" and the agent's testimony
regarding the seizure were admitted over Ramapuram's objection that the evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure. The
district court held that Ramapuram possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy as to matters in the trunk of the car, but it
concluded that the warrantless search was justified by exigent
circumstances, relying on cases involving warrantless searches
and seizures of weapons and explosives.5
632 F.2d 1149 (4th Cir. 1980).
Under the doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), fourth
amendment protection does not extend to open fields.
632 F.2d at 1151.
'Le at 1152.
Id-
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On appeal, the circuit court noted that "nothing in the
record sufficiently established a high volatibility and grave
potential of explosion for the stolen dynamite."' If the dynamite
were in the car it could be kept from Ramapuram. and the exigency of the search was reduced. The court, however, declined
to decide whether such "exigency once removed" sufficed to
7
render a warrant unnecessary.
Instead, the court found a "more direct and established
ground" which validated the warrantless search and seizure.
That is, Ramapuram had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the trunk of the automobile. The fourth amendment prohibition
of a warrantless search does not apply to locations in which one
cannot reasonably expect materials to be accorded privacy.
However, even though he had decided to keep secret the stolen
dynamite, thus giving rise to a subjective expectation of
privacy, Ramapuram's expectation was not a reasonable,
legitimate or justifiable one.
The court looked to the totality of circumstances to find the
privacy expectation was not reasonable. First, under the Hester
doctrine,8 the fourth amendment protection does not extend to
open fields.' The fact that the dynamite was enclosed in the
junker's trunk rather than left uncovered in the grass was not
important. "[W]hatever expectation of privacy attends a closed
but unsecured 'effect' generally is diminished where the 'effect'
itself is placed in an area totally without the protection of the
fourth amendment such as in an open field."" Second, the
"automobile exception" did not apply since the auto was not
functioning as a vehicle capable of transporting people or property." Moreover, in noting that an automobile was involved acIdId. at 1153.

265 U.S. at 59.
Exigent circumstances permitting a warrantless search of an automobile
are found when the car is stopped on the highway and probable cause exists.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In the present case, the majority
found that the automobile exception did not apply as the car was not operational.
,0 632 F.2d at 1155 (citing United States v. Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658-59 (4th
Cir. 1978)).
" Id. at 1156; Cf. United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 454, 457-58 (4th
Cir. 1979).
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tually lessened the expectation of privacy. The court went on to
determine the issue based on the "actual characteristics" of the
container in the present case, not other containers which may
present themselves in other cases. 2 Finally, the court considered the character of the invaded place. Ramapuram failed to
lock the trunk; he did not live on the farm; the farm was leased
to others; and the farm was used by persons who were not
family members or farm residents. All these factors combined to
further diminish Ramapuram's expectations of privacy.
A strong dissent emphasized the Supreme Court's
preference thaf law enforcement officials secure warrants
before searching private property, and the presumption that a
warrantless search of private property is per se unreasonable.
The majority failed, the dissent charged, to find that the search
in Ramapuram fell within one of the clearly delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement."
The majority relied on the Hester "open-field" doctrine to
lessen Ramapuram's expectation of privacy in an auto parked in
a field." The Supreme Court has cited Hester to support the
plain-view doctrine. However, the Hester open-field exception
had not before been used by the courts to permit a police officer
to search an object in an open field, the contents of which are
secluded from his view." Under a straight-forward reading of
Hester a visual search of the exterior of the car in the field and
of other parts in plain view could have been searched without a
warrant, while the enclosed trunk could not have been.
The dissent found the Ramapuram facts analogous to those
in United States v. Bradshaw." There, officers approached the
"

632 F.2d at 1156; United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1346 (2nd Cir.

1979).

IS 632 F.2d at 1157.

, See Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861;
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
11In United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208, (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 909 (1974) agents were permitted, under Hester, to search the field around
the barn, but not inside the barn itself. In United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451
(5th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979), the court held that open fields
surrounding a house are not protected under the fourth amendment, while the
curtilege, the home, and its immediate appurtenances are proteced.
11490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
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defendant's home and smelled whiskey coming from a truck
parked near the house. They peered through a crack in the rear
doors of the truck and spotted jugs containing moonshine. The
court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation in
the contents of the truck bed, as the truck was parked on
defendant's premises and the contents could not be viewed ex17
cept by someone who deliberately peered through the crack.
The court concluded that there were no circumstances that
would have dispensed with the warrant requirement as two
agents could have guarded the truck while the third obtained a
warrant. 8
Similarly, Ramapuram's vehicle was on his private, rural
property and the contents of the truck were not visible to the
casual passerby. And, as in Bradshaw, there were enough
agents to stand guard while others went to secure the warrant.
Therefore, because of the strong presumption in favor of
search warrants and the lack of circumstances which would mandate dispensing with a warrant, the dissent concluded that the
search and seizure of Ramapuram's property was unreasonable,
and the evidence thus obtained should have been suppressed.19
United-States v. Muhammad" also involved a warrantless
search and seizure of evidence found in the trunk of a car. FBI
agents suspected Muhammad of bank robbery and set up a
surveillance of his vehicle which was parked near his apartment.
Muhammad and his wife approached the car and Muhammad
opened the trunk. When he saw the agents approaching, he
quickly closed the trunk.
The agents arrested Muhammad and several hours later, impounded his car. The agents, who were concerned that an accomplice could have been concealed in the trunk, forced open the
lock and found a gun, ammunition and a bag of the stolen money.
The evidence was introduced at Muhammad's trial.
In denying the motion to suppress, the district court found
that because there was probable cause at the scene of the crime
IL at 1101.
,sId. at 1103.
'9

632 F.2d at 1161.
658 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1981).
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to make the warrantless search, the agents could have delayed
the search until the car had been taken to headquarters."'
Moreover, the possibility of a hidden accomplice justified the
warrantless search of the trunk.
The circuit court affirmed. When a moving car is stopped by
law enforcement officials who have probable cause to search the
car, under Chambers v. Maroneyl both an immediate warrantless search and a subsequent warrantless station house
search are permitted. When the car is stationary at the time of
arrest, Coolidge v. New Hampshire" requires the presence of
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.
The court found exigent circumstances present in Muhammad: the police had probable cause to believe the car contained
contraband; there may have been confederates available or
alerted to move the evidence; and there may have been an accomplice hiding in the trunk.24
In his dissent, Judge Murnaghan, who wrote the majority
opinion in Ramapuram, noted that the exigent circumstances required to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant were not present here. During the time the car was guarded at the parking
lot, the agents could have obtained a search warrant.
The dissent emphasized the "risk" factor that must be present to justify immediate action. If waiting for a warrant would
risk the destruction, disappearance or removal of the objects of
the search, or would increase the risk of harm to policemen or
innocent bystanders, then an immediate warrantless search is
justified."
Here, the car was immobilized by agents so confederates
could not have moved it. The expressed fear of the agents that
an accomplice could be hiding in the trunk was "far-fetched,"
and "implausible," as the agents had no reasonable grounds for
such a suspicion. "Adopting such a basis for avoiding the fourth
amendment's stringent warrant requirements is an open invitaat 251.
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
403 U.S. 443 (1971).

z' Id

U 658

F.2d at 253.

SId. at 254.
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tion to 28riots of imagination, at the expense of facts and of
reality.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of
motions to suppress evidence gathered in a warrantless search
and seizure in a consolidated case, Sharpe v. United States.'
The court found that a vehicle stop based on less than probable
cause must be brief, or will be considered an unreasonable
seizure under the fourth amendment. 8
In Sharpe, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) tailed an obviously overloaded pickup truck with an
attached camper which was being followed by a Pontiac. The
agent radioed for aid, and a highway patrolman joined the procession. The state patrolman stopped the truck, while the DEA
agent went after the car. The patrolman gave the driver,
Savage, no reason for the stop, but told Savage he could not
leave until the DEA agent arrived.
The agent arrived 15 minutes later after having stopped the
Pontiac. The agent went to the rear of the truck, said that he
detected the odor of marijuana, and unlocked the camper with
keys he removed from the ignition. Inside there were several
well-wrapped bales. Sharpe and Savage were arrested, and the
truck was taken to the federal building. Two or three days later,
without a warrant, the agent unloaded the truck, opened the
bales and found marijuana.
On appeal, the circuit court considered whether the vehicle
stops and the detention of the defendants were unlawful
seizures. It found that the investigatory stops of the vehicles
were justified by the agent's "articulable and reasonable suspicion" that Sharpe and Savage were engaged in drug trafficking.'
to justify investigatory stops of the vehicles.2
However, the stops failed to meet the brevity requirement
of vehicle stops based on less than probable cause. The court
emphasized the Supreme Court's reliance on the short length of
a stop on the street to frisk for weapons, and in vehicle stops to
Id.at 256.
= No. 79-5314, slip op. (4th Cir. September 4, 1981).

Id at 7-8.
Id at 6-7.
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justify the elimination of the probable cause requirement. For
example, in United States v. Brigoni-Ponce,1 the border investigatory stop was justified on the ground that the intrusion
was of modest duration, usually no more than one minute, and
involved only a question or two.
Here, Sharpe was detained without probable cause for
thirty-five minutes, while Savage was held for fifteen. The
length of these detentions transformed them into de facto arrests without probable cause, and were thus viewed as illegal
seizures.2
The court went on to conclude that because the defendants
were illegally detained, the marijuana found during the search
should have been suppressed as fruits of the illegality. Had the
truck not been stopped for longer than the permissible period,
the agent would not have smelled the marijuana.
The court found an equally compelling ground for suppressing the bales of marijuana based on the recent Supreme Court
decision in Robbins v. California." In Robbins, the Court held
that a warrantless search of packages of marijuana wrapped in
opague green plastic and stored in the recessed luggage compartment of a station wagon was unconstitutional. The Court rejected the proposal that the natuie of the container may
diminish the constitutional protection to which it would otherwise be entitled, or that a distinction should be drawn between
sturdy luggage and flimsy cardboard boxes. "What one person
may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag...
[No] court, no constable, no citizen, can sensibly be asked to
distinguish the relative 'privacy interests' in a closed suitcase,
briefcase, portfolio, duffle bag, or box."'
In Sharpe, the well-packaged bales were "closed containers"
within the meaning of Robbins, and since their appearance did
not manifest their contents, the warrantless searches were unconstitutional.
Mary Lou Hill
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
" No. 79-5314, slip op. at 8-9.

101 S.Ct. 2841 (1981).

Id at 2846.

u No. 79-5314, slip op. at 12.
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II.

PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS AS
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS

The Fourth Circuit, evaluating the validity of an earlier ruling35 in light of a recent Supreme Court decision,36 found the two
compatible in holding that prosecutorial vindictiveness had effected a denial of due process to the petitioner in United States
v. Goodwin. 7
Goodwin had been convicted in the District Court for the
District of Maryland of the felony of forcible assualt on a federal
officer,38 but was indicted and tried for the offense only after exercising his right to insist on a jury trial of "petty offense and
misdemeanor charges originally lodged against him for the same
conduct." 9
The charges against the defendant stemmed from an encounter with a United States Park policeman on the BaltimoreWashington Parkway in the District of Columbia. After checking the defendant's license and registration the officer observed,
with a flashlight, a clear plastic bag in the defendant's car. When
asked to surrender the bag, the defendant instead sped away,
and in so doing the accelerating car struck the officer and knocked him to the highway. Although a high-speed chase ensued, the
defendant eluded the officer in heavy traffic.
The next day the officer filed a complaint charging the
defendant with various petty offenses and misdemeanors, including assault, and a federal magistrate issued a warrant for
the defendant's arrest. The defendant was arrested, and released on his own recognizance, but failed to appear on the date set
for trial; shortly thereafter the defendant was apprehended
elsewhere and returned to Maryland.
At that time the government's attorney and defendant's
counsel entered into plea negotiations. The prosecutor did not
then mention that the defendant could be indicted, or otherwise
suggest that he might seek an indictment, under the felonyUnited States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976).

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981).
18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).

637 F.2d at 251.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

59

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
[Vol. 84

assault statute." Thus, at the time the defendant declined to
plead guilty, and insisted on a jury trial, he was charged only
with misdemeanor violations under various "fleeing and
eluding" statutes. 1
After transfer of the case to the district court, necessitated
by the defendant's refusal to plead guilty, the government's attorney sought a felony assault indictment" and filed a supporting affidavit. 3 The defendant subsequently stood trial, and
was convicted of both the felony and the Maryland "fleeing and
eluding" misdemeanors. 4
At conclusion of the trial the defendant moved to set aside
the felony conviction, alleging prosecutorial vindictiveness. The
trial judge however, found the prosecutor's affadavit sufficiently
demonstrated good cause to excuse his delay in seeking the indictment. 5 When the issue was presented on appeal, however,
the Fourth Circuit ordered reversal of the felony conviction."
40 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) The government attorney involved was a Justice
Department trial lawyer on a two-week special assignment to try petty offenses
and misdemeanors before the magistrate. This may explain why an indictment
was not sought initially, since this would have required that the case be transferred to the district court, with some delay inevitable; it may also explain, in
part, the prosecutor's decision to seek the indictment once the defendant insisted
the case be transferred. Cf. infra note 43. The court's opinion noted, however,
that one of the purposes of the law in this area is to "spare courts the unseemly
task of probing the actual motives of the prosecutor." 637 F.2d at 255.
," 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (1976) (apparently dismissed prior to trial); MD. TRANSP.

CODE ANN § 21-904 (1977). See infra note 46.

42 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1976). See supra note 40.
'3 The prosecutor's affadavit listed several reasons

for belatedly seeking the
indictment: 1) the serious nature of the defendant's conduct in the incident;
2) the defendant's lengthy history of violent crime; 3) the defendant's conduct
was suspected of being linked to major narcotics transactions; 4) the defendant
had advanced a false alibi at the preliminary hearing; and 5) the defendant had
failed to appear for trial. It did not allege that these factors were unknown or undiscoverable prior to the preliminary hearing or the plea negotiations. 637 F.2d at
252; see FED. R. CRali. P. 12(b)(1), and infra note 45. Cf. supra note 40.
" See supra note 41.
, Ordinarily a motion for indictment must be filed before trial unless good
cause is shown to excuse failure to do so. See FED. R. CRan. P. 12(b)(1). Note that a
date for trial had been set and had passed with the defendant failing to appear.
" The Fourth Circuit affirmed, however, the defendant's misdeameanor
"fleeing and eluding" conviction. The defendant argued for reversal on two
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The Fourth Circuit had previously gone further than other
circuits in recognizing denials of due process resulting from prosecutorial vindictiveness.47 In United States v. Johnson48 the
court found "vindictiveness" requiring reversal where a second
indictment, alleging more serious offenses, had been obtained
only after the defendant had succeeded in setting aside guilty
pleas to an earlier indictment. Although lacking any evidence
that the prosecutor had in fact acted maliciously, Johnson
reasoned that a defendant's right to due process is violated
whenever circumstances show that a fear of prosecutorial
retaliation may have a chilling effect on a defendant's decision to
exercise fundamental constitutional rights. If a defendant's decision to remain silent, request a jury, or test a conviction by appeal is compromised by a fear of retaliation, the chilling effect is
clearly the same regardless of the presence or absence of actual
vindictiveness in the prosecutor's decision. While a degree of
prosecutorial discretion is essential to the criminal justice
system, the importance of safeguarding fundamental constitutional rights requires that the focus of inquiry be the effect of
the prosecutor's actions on the defendant, gauged by objective

theories: first, that the warrant was defective because it failed to allege all the
elements of the Maryland statute; second, that the Maryland statute had been
pre-empted by Federal regulations governing traffic offenses in the District of
Columbia. Neither issue was discussed extensively by the court, and a detailed
analysis here would exceed the scope of this article. 637 F.2d at 255-57.
" 637 F.2d 250; United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976).
However, the balancing or "shifting presumption" tests are employed by the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits. See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1978);
Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049
(1978); and United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980). The
immediately preceeding decisions differ from the Fourth Circuit's rule in
strenously refusing to recognize a due process denial solely on a defendant's
showing that circumstances presenting a risk of prosecutorial retaliation existed;
they hold that such a showing merely requires further inquiry, placing the burden
on the prosecutor to objectively prove a legitimate reason for the additional
charges. The Goodwin court noted that nothing in its holding prevented rebuttal
by a prosecutor through objective proof, but stated that "[tlo the extent that
[these cases] permit a more far-reaching inquiry into the actual motivation of prosecutors, we are not persuaded that they comport with the prophylactic rule set
fourth in Blackledge [417 U.S. 21 (1974)]," 637 F.2d at 254 n.1. The Fourth Circuit
has yet to specify what might constitute sufficiently objective proof in such situations. But see supra note 43.
,1537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976).
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proof of the circumstances of the case, rather than reliance on
discovering the subjective motivations of the prosecutor. The
court interpreted this to be the rationale expressed by the
49 the leading case on the
Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Perry,
subject at that time.
In Goodwin, however, the government urged that a mere apprehension of vindictiveness was no longer sufficient to
establish a due process violation, and that the Johnson opinion
had been abrogated by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision
in Bordenkircher v. Hayes." In Bordenkircher the Court found
no due process violation when a prosecutor threatened to increase charges against a defendant during plea negotiations and
later made good that threat after negotiations had broken down.
The majority in Goodwin rejected this contention on several
grounds. 1 Initially noting its great reluctance to overrule an
earlier decision without an en banc hearing, it further observed
that actual vindictiveness may have been present in Goodwin's
case." Bordenkircher was construed as limited to its facts, that
is, when the "risk" of increased charges is made known to the
defendant during plea negotiations. 3 In Goodwin, as noted
earlier, no prior mention was made of the prosecutor's intention
(or ability) to obtain a felony indictment if the defendant refused
to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charges. The court considered this a basic factual distinction making Bordenkircherinapplicable; the earlier Johnson rule was considered as limited
only within the specific factual situation of Bordenkircher
(where the risk of increased charges is made known to the
defendant prior to his decision to exercise constitutional rights).
"9417 U.S. 21 (1974). Blackledge recognized a denial of due process in a case
where a prosecutor brought more serious charges against a defendant who had
requested a trial de novo in a court of record after being convicted of a misdemeanor in magistrate court. It held such additional charges constitutionally impermissible when a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, rather than actual vindictiveness, was shown.
434 U.S. 357 (1978).
1 637 F.2d at 253-55.

Id. at 254; see supra note 40.
1 637 F.2d at 253-54 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 362 (1978)),
wherein the Court emphasized that its holding in Bordenkircherwas limited to
the facts of that case.
2
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Judge Widener's dissenting opinion complained that the majority's rule required "that a prosecuting attorney must see to it
that formal charges are initially filed for the most serious offense of which defendant might be guilty or else forever forfeit
the right to prosecute .... 1"It should be noted, however, that
Goodwin limits the prosecutor's discretion only after a defendant chooses to exercise a fundamental constitutional right; this
may, as here, occur during plea negotiations or may not occur
until appeal after trial. Indeed, requiring that the most serious
charges possible be brought prior to plea negotiations would
seem to work to the prosecutor's advantage in bargaining. With
due deference to the need for prosecutorial discretion, the "evil"
perceived by Judge Widener might be argued to impose nothing
harsher than due diligence, in thorough preparation, on a prosecutor.
Focusing further on the problems of the prosecutor, the dissent claimed the majority's result inconsistent with Bordenkircher: "While an expressed threat of retaliation will not suffice to
set aside a conviction because of Bordenkircher,merely a general
risk of retaliation without the expressed threat will ....
This
observation ignores the majority's underlying rationale, which
considered the effect of such a risk on a defendant's decision to
exercise a constitutional right; it does, however, recognize the
rule's practical effect on a prosecutor conducting plea negotiations: when in doubt, threaten early and often.
Kenneth P. Simons, II
III.

SPEEDY TRIAL

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has apparently given its final word in the epic saga of Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald, accused of the brutal murder of his pregnant wife and
two daughters over a decade ago. In the most recent proceeding
to be styled United States v. MacDonald," the Fourth Circuit
denied a government request that an en banc panel be convened
for a rehearing. Although the per curiam denial was without an

u 637 F.2d at 257.

J&d.

635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980).
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opinion, it was accompanied by a brief dissenting statement by
Chief Judge Haynsworth;57 another, relatively lengthy dissent,
representing the views of four other judges of the circuit," and a
statement by the author of the panel opinion as well.59 This is
one of many extraordinary aspects of what Chief Judge
Haynsworth labeled a "very extraordinary case;"6 the opinions
of the dissenting judges have, however, taken on a still greater
significance: the Supreme Court has, on the government's petition, granted certiorari to review the case. 1
At issue is the propriety of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the sixth amendment's speedy trial guarantee; 62 the appeals court has twice held that MacDonald was deprived of that
right due to the government's delay in prosecution.63 The unique
facts of the case illustrate the difficulty in resolving it under the
relatively limited jurisprudence generated by the speedy trial
clause.
At the time of the crimes involved, Dr. Jeffrey R. MacDonald was an Army surgeon, commissioned as a Captain "and
stationed with his family at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. In the
early morning hours of February 17, 1970, the military police
received a call from MacDonald, went to the family's quarters,
and found MacDonald's pregnant wife and two daughters had
been clubbed and stabbed to death. MacDonald told them that
he had been asleep on a couch when he was awakened by his
wife's screams; had himself been attacked, stabbed, and knocked
unconscious by three or four intruders in "hippie" garb, and had
summoned help upon regaining consciousness.
The Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the local police
immediately began investigating the crime. No direct evidence
5 Id. at 1116.
Id. (Russell, Widener, Hall & Phillips, J.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1123 (Murnaghan, J.)
Id. at 1116.
" 101 S.Ct. 3004 (1981).
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S.
850 [MacDonald I]; United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 101 S.Ct. 3004 (1981) [MacDonald III.
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of the purported intruders was found, however, an analysis of
several items of physical evidence cast further doubt on MacDonald's initial statement. On April 6, 1970, MacDonald was informed he was suspected of having committed the murders,
relieved of his medical duties, and restricted to quarters by his
commanding officer. On May 1, 1970, the Army formally charged
him with the murders.
Shortly thereafter the Army held an Article 3264 hearing,
the military procedure for determining whether an accused
should be held for a general court martial. After hearing extensive testimony from both sides, the presiding officer recommended the charges against MacDonald be dismissed;' 5 MacDonald was subsequently granted an honorable discharge in
December 1970, moved to California, and bagan the private practice of medicine.
Investigation of the crime continued. The Justice Department urged the Army's CID to continue its investigation; over
the next year and a half the CID conducted nearly 700 interviews, examined physical evidence from the crime, and
forwarded that evidence to the forensic laboratories of the FBI
and Treasury Department. Though practicing medicine in
California, MacDonald cooperated with these efforts, even offering to submit to additional interviews, while personally and
through his attorneys repeatedly requesting that some final
decision be made by the Justice Department to end the protracted investigation of his case. When Justice Department attorneys finally began presenting the case to a grand jury, in
August of 1974, the FBI made still further investigatory efforts,
including exhumation of the victims. Although MacDonald waived his right to remain silent, testifying before the grand jury for
more than five days, a true bill was returned against him on
January 24, 1975.6

U.S.M.J. art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976). See generally E. BYRNE, MILrTARY
LAW §§ 319-20 (1976). The difficulty of accurately analogizing this hearing and

other Army action in the MacDonald case to civilian criminal procedure is a major
point of contention in the opinions in this case.
'3 MacDonald v. Hodson, 19 C.M.A. 582, 42 C.M.R. 184 (1970).
m MacDonald was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b), which extends
federal jurisdiction to cases of murder committed on federal property.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

65

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

In a pre-trial motion MacDonald sought to have his indictment dismissed, contending, inter alia, that he had been denied
his right to a speedy trial; the district court denied the motion,
and MacDonald took an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In a split opinion, 7 the Fourth Circuit found that MacDonald had been deprived of that right, and
ordered that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice.68 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fourth Circuit's ruling,
holding that a pre-trial motion for dismissal on speedy trial
grounds was not an appropriate subject for interlocutory
appeal. 9 MacDonald's next effort, appealing denial of another
pre-trial motion to dismiss, grounded in double jeopardy, was rejected by the Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.

70

When subsequently tried for the murders of nine years
before, MacDonald was convicted of the first-degree murder of
one child and second-degree murder of his wife and other
71
daughter; he was sentenced to three consecutive life terms.
Following the verdict MacDonald again appealed to the
Fourth Circuit; he alleged several errors in the rulings at trial,
but also contended, predictably, that the delay prior to indictment had deprived him of his sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial, as well as his rights to due process. 72 Acknowledging that
"[o]n MacDonald's sixth amendment claim, we do not write on a
clean slate,'

7

the Fourth Circuit, reiterating much of the reason-

ing and conclusions of its earlier opinion, reversed his convic'" United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S.
850 (1978).

531 F.2d at 209.

The Court did not address the merits of the claim but, recognizing the

elements of such a claim, stated "[tihe resolution of a speedy trial claim
necessitates a careful assessment of the particular facts of the case ... and are
best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial." 435
U.S. at 858.
" United States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
440 U.S. 961 (1979).
" The district judge's views as to the merits of MacDonald's sixth amend-

ment claim may be found in his denial of a motion for admission to bail pending
appeal. United States v. MacDonald, 485 F.Supp. 1087, 1089 (E.D.N.C. 1979).
United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cr. 1980).

Id. at 260.
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tion. A motion by the government for an en banc rehearing was
the Supreme Court has acdenied; 74 as noted earlier however,
7 5
cepted the case for review.
The sixth amendment's first clause states simply that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial. '76 It was not until 1967, however, that
this directive was recognized as a fundamental constitutional
right.7 7 In the years since the Supreme Court has attempted to
define its parameters.
The Court's first exposition of relatively specific guidelines
was in 1972, in Barker v. Wingo.7 8 There the Court recognized
the interest of the accused in avoiding lengthy pre-trial incarceration, anxiety, and prejudice to his ability to defend
himself caused by the passage of time; the Court also recognized
a societal interest in speedy administration of the criminal
justice system. Noting that any attempt to compare these interests with the need to accord wide latitude to prosecutorial
discretion would necessarily require an ad hoc balancing approach," the Court stated:
We can do little more than identify some of the factors courts
should consider in determining whether a particular defendant
has been deprived of his rights ... we identify four such factors:
length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."
"' United States v. MacDonald, 635 F.2d 1115 (4th Cir. 1980). See infra note

75.

" The questions presented in the petition for certiorari may be summarized
as: 1) Does the Speedy Trial Clause apply to period during which a person is not

under arrest or formally accused of a crime? and 2) Were defendant's constitutional rights violated by delay between commission of crime and return of indict-

ment? 49 U.S.L.W. 3842 (May 12, 1981). Insofar as space limitations of the Federal
Overview prevent a more thorough treatment which would include an analysis of

sixth amendment decisions as well as the history of this case, this discussion will
focus on the questions presented in the petition for certiorari.
7'U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). But cf. United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); Beavers
v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905) (pre-1967 cases discussing the right to speedy

trial).
,8407 U.S. 514 (1972).

Id. at 530.

80I&
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The Court stated that the first factor, length of delay, "is to
some extent a triggering mechanism.""' This seems merely to
acknowledge that some substantial or unusual delay should be
shown to merit further consideration of a speedy trial claim, but
the Court added that the delay shown must be "presumptively
prejudicial. 8 2 Although the Court expressly declined to set any
particular period of time that would be considered presumptively prejudicial in every case, it did suggest an analysis should
be based on the nature of the crime. 3 The lower federal courts
however, have frequently attempted to quantify the length of
delay that must be shown."
The reason for the delay, the second factor considered under
Barker, is usually not so troublesome. Of course, if the
defendant's actions were the sole reason for the delay, he has
not been deprived of his right. If the delay is attributable to prosecutorial inaction, vindictiveness, or desire to gain a tactical advantage over the accused, the delay will weigh heavily against
the government. Any delay caused by overcrowded dockets, or
similar reasons, is considered "neutral," weighing against the
government but seldom given much effect.
In discussing when a defendant has sufficiently asserted his
right to a speedy trial, the Barker court disapproved the
"demand-waiver" rule then in effect in many jurisdictions.85
Under that rule, any delay alleged by a defendant could be considered only from the date the defendant complained of it,
whether by demanding trial or moving to dismiss his charges on
that ground. The Court considered such a requirement "insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental,"8 but still
insisted that an accused in some way affirmatively assert the
right to sustain a claim of its denial.
The final factor, prejudice to the defendant, was explained
as representing three interests of the defendant. Those interests included "(i) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarcera' 1 1Id.

' Id.

Id.

" See Note, Right to Speedy Trial in CivilianProsecutionDenied By Delay
Following Dismissal of Military Charges, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 97 n.77
(1981).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524 n.20 (1972).

Id. at 529-30.
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tion; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii)
87
to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.1
Moore v. Arizona,' decided the following year, held that a showing of possible, rather than actual, prejudice to the defense was
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof.89 Barker's guidelines
are to be employed in determining when an accused has not "enjoy[ed] the right to a speedy ... trial;"9 what moved the five
judges of the circuit to dissent from the denial of en banc
rehearing, however,9' was their insistence that the delay in MacDonald's case occured during a period when he was not sufficiently "accused" for sixth amendment purposes. The majority
in both MacDonald opinions 92 ruled that the date of the indictment was not determinative of the length of delay when the
defendant had been arrested for the crime prior to his indictment.
Relying on United States v. Marion,93 the Supreme Court's
most detailed examination to date of when the speedy trial right
attaches, 4 the majority observed that "the Court carefully
avoided adopting a simplistic rule that pre-indictment delay is
always immaterial. Instead, referring to the values which the
speedy trial provision safeguards, the Court explained that arrest furnishes an alternative starting point for determining the
length of delay."9 " The prevailing majority went on to hold that
", Id. at 532; the third interest was regarded as the most significant of the
three.
414 U.S. 25 (1973).
Barker v. Wingo held that possible rather than actual prejudice was sufficient to sustain the burden of proof. But see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S.
783 (1977) (showing of actual prejudice required under due process analysis for

lengthy pre-trial delay). United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980)
(Bryan, J., dissenting) (MacDonald was not able to demonstrate at trial that his

defense had actually been prejudiced by the passage of time, but had raised the
due process issue on appeal).
'0 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
91Which apparently also moved the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. See

supra note 75.
1 See supra note 63.
'7 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
See also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975).
United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 202 (1976). The specific
language from United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), cited by the MacDonald I court is:
[lit is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actualrestraintsimposed by arrest and holding to
'7
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MacDonald's initial military arrest had satisfied the Marion
standard for beginning the length of delay.
Both the dissent in the MacDonald II opinion and the five
judges dissenting from denial of the motion for rehearing objected to the majority's beginning date.96 The interval between
MacDonald's discharge from the Army" and his indictment, they
argued, should not have been included in determining the length
of delay. They reasoned that, as no formal charges were then
pending against MacDonald there was no trial, or even a hearing
he could demand, as there is no right to demand arrest or indictment;" thus no right to a speedy trial had attached. Equating
the Article 32 proceedings with dismissal of an indictment, the
dissenting judges asserted that "in assessing the length of delay
under a sixth amendment claim it is not appropriate to take into
account periods during which a defendant was under no accusation." 9
The dissent based this conclusion on the holding of the Sixth
0 that of the
Circuit in United States v. Martin,"'
Ninth Circuit in
Arnold v. McCarthy,"' and provisions of the Speedy Trial Act."2
1 3 notwithstanding,
As to the latter, its "legislative imprimatur""
the majority in MacDonald I observed that "the Act does not
purport to mark the bounds of the sixth amendment's speedy
trial clause," ' 4 a point apparently conceded sub silentio by the
dissent.
answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the

speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment... Invocation of the speedy
trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.... 404 U.S. at 320-21 (emphasis added).
" See United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258, (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. MacDonald, 635 F.2d 1115, (4th Cir. 1980).
MacDonald's discharge barred any further military proceedings against
him. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
9 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966).
635 F.2d at 1116.
'
543 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977).
101 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1973).
1
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (1974). This section requires exclusion of any interval following dismissal of an initial indictment in computing delay under the Act; See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1975).
10 635 F.2d at 1118.
10 531 F.2d 196, 204 n.15 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Assuming the accuracy of the dissent's characterization of
the Article 32 proceedings as the equivalent of an indictment,
the cited cases would require that the pre-indictment (1975)
period be excluded from calculation of the length of delay; the
authority of these cases, however, seems open to question.
This can be seen initially in the statement of Judge Murnaghan, author of the MacDonald II opinion:
Few, if any absolutes exist in our judicial system. Each case
presents its peculiar difficulties. While in U.S. v. Martin the
court said that the interval should not count, it did not say that
it would never count.... For authority applicable to this particular case, the decision in [MacDonald 1] is more compelling
than a decision on different facts in another circuit.1 5
Judge Murnaghan's emphasis of the unique factual aspects of
MacDonald's is not without basis; unlike the defendants in
Martin and Arnold v. McCarthy, MacDonald enjoyed the
dubious distinction of being the first person ever tried in a
civilian court after being cleared by the military of charges arising from the same conduct.' 6 Perhaps most importantly, neither
Martin nor Arnold v. McCarthy advanced any direct authority
for their determination that upon dismissal of an indictment a
defendant is no longer "accused," notwithstanding the fact that
the defendant is then at the mercy of the prosecutor's discretion
7
in seeking reindictment.1
Proper calculation of the length of delay in MacDonald's
case was regarded as critical by the dissenting judges: under
their reading of Barker v. Wingo, elimination of the preindictment period from the calculation would be "completely
dispositive"' " of his sixth amendment claim. It is doubtful,
1

Id. at 199.

Id.
R' (citation omitted).
10 However, the use of nolle prosequi in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) was disallowed. Although one of the deficiencies of North Carolina's
use of the device in Klopfer was its effect in tolling the statute of limitations, no
such limitation protected MacDonald in this case, as Congress has declared there
shall be no limitation of time on a prosecution for murder. 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1948).
See also United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (definition
of "capital offense" under 18 U.S.C. § 3281 not dependent on current constitutionality of death penalty).
"1 635 F.2d at 1116.
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however, that such a position could be justified upon a careful
reading of Barker, despite the tendency of some lower courts to
attempt to impose quantitative analyses upon the length of
delay." 9
The dissenting opinion places heavy reliance on the length
of delay as a "triggering" factor, asserting that "[u]nless such
delay is sufficiently lengthy to be assessed as 'presumptively
prejudicial,' the claim of constitutional violation must fail and it
is unnecessary for the court to consider any of the other factors
listed in Barker."" This observation is based on Barker's
language that states "[t]he length of delay is to some extent a
triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into
the other factors that go into the balance."''
Such an inflexible interpretation by the dissent overlooks
the Court's prefacatory remarks in Barker immediately
preceeding the passage quoted above, as well as further
qualifications later in the opinion:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy
trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant had been deprived of his
right.... We regard none of the four factors identified above as
either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Rather, they are
related factors and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors
have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process."'
The language above would seem to indicate that, at least in
theory, a presumptively prejudicial delay is not always a
necessary condition to finding a deprivation of the right.
Moreover, the extraordinary amount of national publicity
generated by MacDonald's case, as well as the interference in
" See Note, Right to Speedy Trialin CivilianProsecutionDeniedBy Delay
Following Dismissal of Military Charges, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 97 n.76
(1981).
"1o635 F.2d at 1116 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1967)) (footnote

omitted).
' 407 U.S. at 530.

Id at 530, 533 (emphasis added).
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his professional life caused by the protracted investigation
would seem to clearly be other circumstances that may be relevant, and that must be considered together with the four Barker
factors.
Finally, further evidence that the length of delay, or any
other of the Barker factors, were not intended to be so unswervingly applied can be found by the Court's approving citation of
an opinion by then-District Judge Frankel."' In United States v.
Mann"' Judge Frankel observed that if the absence or insufficiency of any one factor "could by itself defeat the defendant in
every case, it would certainly not be aptly described as being
merely one of four 'factors' to be weighed together."'' Thus it
appears that the length of delay should have been accorded the
initially-determinative, "threshhold" status attributed it by the
dissenting judges.
By their citation of Martin, Arnold v. McCarthy, and the
Speedy Trial Act, perhaps the judges who dissented from the
denial of rehearing were actually making an unspoken point:
that the majority opinion, like Martin and Arnold v. McCarthy,
was really supported only by differing interpretations of the
"arrest or holding to answer" language of United States v.
8
Marion.
Regardless of whether this was their intention, it seems a
valid criticism of the majority's holding. The majority might
have better supported its conclusion by looking to a case with
facts more closely resembling MacDonald's case. An alternative
basis for concluding that MacDonald's right to a speedy trial attached before his indictment, regardless of the fact that no
charge was technically pending against him, might be found in a
decision of the First Circuit.
"

Id. at 633 n.36 (citing United States v. Mann, 291 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y.

1968)).

291, F. Supp. 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
,, In Mann the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss his indictment for tax evasion when he faced trial nine years after the date of the indictment and sixteen years after the alleged criminal acts; the motion was sustained on the basis of a sixth amendment speedy trial claim, with the court emphasizing the length of delay as one of the factors to be weighed, not merely as a
triggering mechanism; the court also found that the delay had actually prejudiced
the defendant's ability to meet the charges due to loss of records and recollections, but found none of the other factors that would later be set forth in Barker
to be present.
11

115404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
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117 where the defendant appealed
In United States v. Cabral,
his possessory firearms conviction,118 the court held that Cabral
had become an "accused" for sixth amendment purposes on the
date the firearm was delivered to a federal officer; this notwithstanding the fact that no federal arrest had been made and
no federal indictment had been returned at the time. Cabral had
been arrested by a Maine state police officer investigating
Cabral's possible involvement in auto theft. When initially taken
into custody, however, the officer told Cabral that he was being
arrested for possession of a sawed-off shotgun, "as openers."",
Immediately thereafter Cabral was told he was also under arrest for grand larceny; he was arraigned on the state grand
larceny charge, and held for past parole violations in another
state; he was never formally charged by the state for possession
of the illegal firearm, and the state grand larceny charge was
dismissed sometime later. Although the firearm was delivered
to federal authorities three days after Cabral's arrest by the
state officers, no indictment was returned until some fifteen
months later.

In determining when Cabral had become an "accused" for
sixth amendment purposes, the court stated:
[T]he testimony of [the state police officer] unequivocally
demonstrates that he arrested appellant for possession of the il-

legal firearm. The government's prosecution of this charge was
initiated only three days later when [the federal authorities
received the gun]. Under these circumstances ... it is clear that
appellant's right to a speedy trial crystallized at the time of his
initial arrest."

Thus, the failure of the state to pursue the firearms violation
beyond the initial, warrantless arrest apparently did not prevent Cabral from being sufficiently "accused" when federal
agents received the weapon three days later.
If the analysis in Cabral is applied to MacDonald's case, the

exact character, or indeed the result (dismissal), of MacDonald's
"T

475 F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1973).

I's 26 U.S.C. § 5861(i) (1970) (possession of a firearm not identified by a serial
number).
" 475 F.2d at 718.
120Id
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military charges may no longer be as problematical in determining the beginning date of his delay. MacDonald and Cabral were
both initially arrested for acts later charged as crimes by
federal indictment; Cabral's violation of the Maine firearms
statute was never pursued beyond arrest, and MacDonald's
military charges were dismissed prior to the convening of a
general court martial, but in both cases the defendants were
subject to federal prosecution after their arrests, jurisdiciton
being present from the time the crimes were committed. Cabral
recognized that once arrested, a defendant can be considered
"[held] to answer"12' the federal charge, for speedy trial purposes, when evidence of the crime is brought to the attention of
the federal authorities. If this rule is applied to the facts of MacDonald's case, all that would remain to be determined is
whether MacDonald's "prosecution .. .was initiated"' 2 at the
time of the initial FBI involvement (in February of 1970) or upon
the forewarding of the CID report to the Justice Department (in
June of 1972).2n
It is obvious that, at least in Cabral's case, and at the point
of initial FBI involvement in MacDonald's case, the federal ac'
tion at the time Cabral's "right to a speedy trial crystalized"124
was far more investigatory than prosecutorial in nature.
Nonetheless, in both cases the formal federal charges were
brought only after the arresting authorities had failed to pursue
their charges to conviction; the very basis of the speedy trial
guarantee is prompt resolution of charges a defendant has been
held to answer.
The unique factual aspects of United States v. MacDonald
probably had an inordinate effect on the decisions of both the
majority of the Fourth Circuit's judges and the judges dissenting from denial of the motion for rehearing en banc. The
heinous nature of the crime MacDonald was convicted of, the
121United

States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
475 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1973).
" Use of the later date would not affect the majority's conclusion, since
after the CID report reached the Justice Department "there were still more than
two years in which essentially all that the government did was debate, in a
desultory way, whether to press for prosecution or to drop the case. That delay
was unreasonable and inexcusable." 632 F.2d at 263 n.2.
lu 475 F.2d 715, 718 (1st Cir. 1973).
122
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immense amount of publicity surrounding his subsequent legal
entanglements, and an apparently lackadaisical investigation by
the Justice Department made MacDonald both an unusual and
difficult case.
In determining whether a defendant may be considered an
"accused" for sixth amendment purposes during the period between successive indictments, or at least following dismissal of
military charges, it seems that the only guidance available to
courts is their subjective interpretation of when the defendant
has been "[held] to answer."'" The proper significance to be accorded the length of delay in assessing a sixth amendment claim
is also to some extent an unknown quantity. Perhaps, having
granted certiorari, the Supreme Court will clarify what the
sixth amendment's speedy trial guarantee means in the present
case, as well as future ones.
Kenneth P. Simons, 1I

12

404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).
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CIVIL RIGHTS
I.

SECTION 1983-CONDUCT OF A PRIVATE ACTOR

In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil,1 the Fourth Circuit held that
"merely invoking a state's judicial process and thereafter participating in it solely as private litigant . . .with the state officials who then independently conduct and enforce that
process" is not sufficient to satisfy the "under color of state law"
element in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights action.'
Lugar operated a truck stop in Pittsylvania County,
Virginia, and was indebted to Edmondson Oil. Edmondson Oil
commenced a civil action to recover on the debt in Virginia state
court, and ancillary to that action petitioned for a prejudgment
attachment and levy of certain of Lugar's property to prevent
its dissipation as a judgment satisfaction source.' This petition
was granted. Pursuant to the Virginia statute, a hearing was
held on the propriety of the attachment and levy. A state trial
judge dismissed the attachment on the basis that Edmondson
Oil had failed to carry the burden imposed by the state law to
establish by evidence the grounds for attachment as alleged in
the petition. Subsequently Lugar brought a § 1983 action
against Edmondson Oil alleging that Edmondson Oil's actions
were maliciously inspired and that such use of state officials and
procedures resulted in damages and a deprivation of his property under color of state law. The constitutionality of the
Virginia attachment statute and procedures were not raised as an
issue in the action by either party. The district court concluded
that Lugar had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted under § 1983 and dismissed the complaint, whereupon
Lugar filed an appeal."
In affirming, the Fourth Circuit analyzed "the three basic
patterns into which § 1983 litigation has tended to fall."5 The
first pattern, which makes up the bulk of § 1983 litigation,
639 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
' Id at 1069.
Id. at 1061.
'Id
'Id. at 1063.
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scrutinizes the conduct of state officials acting in their official,
legislative, or executive capacities.' The second pattern
scrutinizes the conduct of private actors where such action can
be attributed to the state through practical compulsion by the
state, a symbiotic state-actor relationship, or through a delegation or abdication to the actor of an exclusive sovereign function." The court viewed a § 1983 action as possessing two interdependent elements: 1) state action, and 2) under color of
state law. If either of these elements are deficient the § 1983 action must fail. In an analysis of the first two patterns it is unnecessary to separate the two elements as by their nature they
are satisfied. Such is not the case with the third pattern of §
1983 actions. This pattern scrutinizes the "conduct of a private
actor [when it] is alleged to have combined with the acts of state
officials at the enforcement or operational level to cause
deprivation of a secured right."8
The court notes that the analysis of the instant case falls into the third pattern of conduct. Thus the court analyzed the contributing conduct of Edmondson Oil and its relationship to the
conduct of the state. Viewing that it is the state's conduct,
whether action or inaction, not the private conduct, that gives
rise to a possible § 1983 cause of action, the court adopted a
totality of conduct approach.9 The product of this analysis was a
court developed test.
'[J]oint engagement or particpation' of private actor with
state official implies such a usurpation or corruption of official
power by the latter that the independence of the enforcing official has been compromised to a significant degree and the official10powers have become in practical effect shared by the
two.
Thus the court held that although an attachment and levy
satisfy the state action element of a § 1983 action, a complaint
alleging only the invoking of a state's judicial process fails to
allege that Edmondson Oil acted under color of state law."
Id,
7 Id. at 1063-64.
Id at 1064 (emphasis added).
9Id,o
Id. at 1069.
'I&
11

Id.
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Judge Butzner, Winter and Murnaghan dissented, on
grounds that the state attachment proceeding allowed a private
party to enlist the services of state officials for private advantage before judicial action, and therefore acting under color of
state law, thus satisfying one element of a § 1983 action. They
also believed that the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v.
Shevin1 2 established a right to a hearing in attachment cases,
and that the second element of § 1983 was satisfied. Dismissal of
the action was, therefore, improper. 1
II. INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS
In Bush v. Muncy, the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion written
by Judge Phillips, held that procedural violations of federal
rights secured to a prisoner by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)'5 do not entitle the prisoner to habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, but does support a cause of action for injunctive and monetary relief under a civil rights action through
42 U.S.C. § 1983N
In June 1975, Bush was charged with unlawful possession of
drugs in Virginia. Later the same month, Maryland authorities,
in two separate county jurisdictions, filed detainers against
Bush stemming from unrelated drug charges. Bush pleaded
guilty to the Virginia charge and was sentenced to Virginia cor12 407

U.S. 67 (1972).

639 F.2d at 1070-72.

659 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id at 404 n.1:
The IAD was promulgated by the Council of State Governments about
1957. See Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. 61, 61 n.1, 305 A.2d 474, 476
n.1 (1973), and has since been adopted by forty-eight states and by Congress on behalf of the United States and the District of Columbia. See 84
Stat. 1397 (1970). The purpose of the IAD is to provide a common procedure for the disposition of detainers between states to avoid, as much
as possible, the disruption of a prisoner's course of rehabilitation and a
prisoner's anxiety with regard to charges pending against him in other
states. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 612 F.2d 806, 809-10 (4th Cir.
1979); Hoss v. State, 266 Md. 136, 142-44, 292 A.2d 48, 52-53 (1972); State
v. Lippolis, 107 N.J. Super. 137, 143-44, 257 A.2d 705, 709-10 (App. Div.
1969).
See also MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 616K-616R, (1957), and VA. CODE §§
53-304.2-53-304.8 (1970).
"2Id. at 404.
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rectional facilities. In November of 1975, Bush was taken to
Maryland for trial on only one of the county's pending charges
against him. Bush was returned to Virginia to await trial. In
February of 1976 he was returned to Maryland, tried and acquitted. At this time there was no disposition of the other pending
Maryland charges. In July 1976, Bush was transferred, over his
protest, to Maryland to face the second set of charges. At this
trial he was convicted.
Bush maintained that in transferring him to Maryland to
face the first set of charges, Virginia authorities failed to
comply with IAD article IV(b) which required notification of "all
other officiers and appropriate courts in the receiving State who
have lodged detainers against the prisoner." 7 The record supported Bush's contention. Bush argued that the second set of
charges, upon which he was convicted, should have been
dismissed as violative of IAD article IV(e) requiring a defendant
to be tried on all charges pending in the receiving state prior to
his return to the sending state.18 Bush unsuccessfully pursued
relief through state court. The state court held that a "supplementary" provision in the Maryland IAD requiring "actual
notice" by Maryland authorities of a prisoner's request to have
all pending charges adjudicated controlled.19 Thus, since no actual notice was given by Bush to Maryland authorities,
Maryland's IAD article IV(e) was not violated. Bush filed both
§ 1983 and habeas corpus claims in the district court. The district
court dismissed all claims and Bush appealed."0
The Fourth Circuit agreed to hear the case and fashioned
the questions as follows:
The threshhold question presented by the appeal is whether the
IAD is federal law, the violation of which might be remediable
under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Assuming the
question is answered in the affirmative, the issue then arises
whether there was alleged a violation of the IAD in this case
that might, in fact, entitle Bush to relief under either or both of
those sections. 1
18 U.S.C. App. 2, art. IV(b).
Id art. IV(e).
19

659 F.2d at 412 n.10.

o Id at 405-06.
I

Id at 406.
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The Fourth Circuit quickly answered the first part of the question. Citing Maine v. Thiboutot' and Cuyler v. Adams2 the court
recognized the Supreme Court's view that the IAD is federal
law since it is a compact among the states sanctioned by Congress. Because it is federal law, § 1983 can provide relief for IAD
violations.24 Relief was limited to physical, mental or emotional
injury and is limited to monetary damages and injunctive
relief.'
The Fourth Circuit left to the district court the question of
whether the Maryland supplementary provision substantially
altered the operation of the IAD or merely clarified or
expressed its intended meaning. The court expressed the view
that the former could not stand as federal law while the latter
would be permissible."
The court also addressed the issue of whether habeas corpus
relief sounded under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a violation of the trial
before return provisions of the IAD. The court held that
"because it does not involve any fundamental right historically
considered critical to the protection of the criminal accused
against unfair prosecution and trial by the state, we hold that,
under David [v. United States]," it is not a violation subject to
collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254." The lower court's
dismissal of the habeas corpus action was therefore proper and
affirmed. The Fourth Circuit, however, instructed the lower
court to allow the § 1983 action upon remand.
III.

PRISONERS' RIGHTS

On September 14, 1981, the Fourth Circuit in Nelson v. Collins' decided a consolidated appeal of three cases addressing the
issue of overcrowded prison conditions and its relationship to
the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punish-

2

z'

448 U.S. 1 (1980).

101 S.Ct. 703 (1981).
659 F.2d at 406.

Id at 414 n.13.
Id. at 412.
2 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
' 659 F.2d at 409.
659 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1981).
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ment. The cases under review included Johnson v. Levine, 30

Nelson v. Collins,31 and Washington v. Keller." Writing for the
court Judge Russell held that double celling is not a per se iiolation of an inmate's constitutional protection against cruel and
unusual punishment but is only one factor to be considered in
examining the totality of circumstances surrounding the
inmate's claim.
The cases arose out of Maryland's unexpected delays in the
construction of new prison facilities which were necessary to accomodate the rise in the prison population and a district court's
order' to take action and relieve the overcrowded prison conditions. Maryland began construction of the Jessup Annex to
relieve overcrowded prison conditions. However, even prior to
its completion the new annex was already expected to be overcrowded. The Maryland authorities planned and instituted a
system of double bunking in dormitory style prison housing and
double celling in their other prisons. To prevent this double celling and double bunking the district court found the Maryland
authorities in contempt of its previous order to relieve the overcrowding despite the good faith attempts by the State of
Maryland to comply. The district court levied civil sanctions as
well as ordered the redistribution of some of Maryland's prison
population to federal facilities.34 Maryland appealed the lower
court's order arguing that the rise in the prison population and
the construction delays were beyond their control and that they
had made good faith attempts to comply with the district court
order. They also argued that the actions taken by the State of
Maryland did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as
proscribed by the constitution.
The Fourth Circuit agreed to review the cases. The court
framed the issues as follows:
(1) Did the District Court err in ruling that double celling at the

Jessup Annex was unconstitutional and represented an invalid
method of relieving overcrowding conditions at the three
prisons involved?
1 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978). See also Johnson v. Levine, 588 F.2d 1378
(4th Cir. 1978).
455 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978).
479 F. Supp. 569 (D.Md. 1979).
Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md. 1978).
659 F.2d at 422-23.
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(2) Was the District Court in error in refusing to permit double
bunking in certain of the dormitories in MHC [Maryland House
of Correction]?
(3) Did the District Court err in ordering the transfer of fifty inmates at MHC and MRDCC [Maryland Reception, Diagnostic &
Classification Center] to federal prisons in its order of April 27,
1981? m
The Fourth Circuit in finding the district court's analysis insufficient and its decisions premature affirmed in part and remanded. Relying upon Bell v. Wolfish" and the recently decided
Rhodes v. Chapman," the court held that the district court erred
in holding that double celling was per se unconstitutional. 8 Double celling, while not desirable, was held as not necessarily unconstitutional. 9 The totality of circumstances assessed upon a
reasonableness standard as measured by contemporary standards of decency is the analytical focal point in deciding whether
a state prison official has violated a prisoner's right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.
Thus the cases were remanded to the district court to expand their scope of inquiry into these issues. The civil contempt
order was specifically vacated as also being governed by a
reasonableness standard." Additionally the court affirmed that
part of the district court order upholding the authority to
transfer prisoners to other facilities if a factual basis as
discussed above is present.4 '
Chief Judge Winter, joined by Judges Butzner and Phillips,
concurred with the court's opinion except with respect to the
court's view on the transferring of the fifty prisoners. They preferred a remand of this issue for a broader, factual determination, rather than an affirmation of that portion of the district
court's order, and thus were more consistent in their approach
to the issues at bar.2
James B. Zimarowski
I& at 423.
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
659 F.2d at 429.
Id at 427-28.
,0Id. at 429.
41 Id.
" Id. at 429-31.
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